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O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 In what is a relatively unusual task for our court, we 
are asked to review a ruling of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“FERC”) approving a revised tariff submitted 
by PJM Interconnection, LLC, that effectively changes 
several aspects of PJM’s tariff as approved in a prior FERC 
order.  FERC is the independent federal agency tasked under 
the Federal Power Act (the “FPA”) with, among other things, 
ensuring that rates charged by public utilities for the 
transmission and sale of energy in interstate commerce, and 
the “rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such 
rates”, are “just and reasonable.”  16 U.S.C. § 824d.   
 
 In 2006, FERC issued an order  (the “2006 Order”) 
approving a new tariff—a set of rules and policies governing 
the interstate sale of electricity and electric capacity—for  the 
PJM market, a vast region covering thirteen states and the 
District of Columbia.  The terms and policies embodied in the 
2006 Order—the result of an extensively negotiated 
settlement between power providers, utility companies, state 
and local authorities and other stakeholders in the region—
sought to ensure the existence of sufficient power generation 
facilities to meet the needs of the PJM market.  To this end, 
the order required that load serving entities (LSEs) in the PJM 
market procure a certain amount of energy capacity—that is, 
additional generation resources that the market may access 
during times of peak load.  The 2006 Order also contained 
rules designed to curb the ability of market participants to 
distort wholesale prices through the exercise of market power.  
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A chief means to that end was the rule that offers for the sale 
of capacity in the PJM markets at artificially low prices 
would, with some notable exceptions, be required to be 
“mitigated”, or raised to a competitive level, based on their 
costs.   
 
 Beginning in April 2011, FERC issued three orders 
(the “2011 Orders”) that altered the terms of the 2006 Order 
in several ways, some substantial.  Among other things, the 
2011 Orders eliminated an exemption from mitigation for 
resources built pursuant to a state mandate.  In addition, the 
2011 Orders eliminated a provision that had guaranteed that 
LSEs that owned their own generation resources, or had 
procured capacity through bilateral contracts, would be able 
to use this “self-supply” to satisfy their own capacity 
obligations.  The 2011 Orders also changed several factors 
used in determining whether a particular offer was subject to 
mitigation. 
 As discussed infra, multiple parties have timely filed 
Petitions for Review of the 2011 Orders.1
                                              
1 We have jurisdiction to review FERC’s orders under FPA § 
313(b), 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b), which provides that, “[a]ny party 
to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved by an order 
issued by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a 
review of such order in the United States Court of Appeals for 
any circuit wherein the licensee or public utility to which the 
order relates is located or has its principal place of business, 
or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, by filing in such court, within sixty days after the 
order of the Commission upon the application for rehearing, a 
written petition praying that the order of the Commission be 
modified or set aside in whole or in part.”  16 U.S.C. § 
  Petitioners New 
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Jersey and Maryland contend that the 2011 Orders amount to 
direct regulation of power facilities in violation of the FPA, 
and that FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 
eliminating the exemption from mitigation for state-mandated 
resources.  Similarly, several municipal and cooperative 
electric utilities challenge FERC’s elimination of the 
assurance that LSEs could use their own self-supply to satisfy 
their capacity obligations.  Finally, various energy providers 
take issue with new rules governing the calculation of a 
resource’s net cost of new entry, which is used in determining 
whether an offer for the sale of capacity will be mitigated, 
and with FERC’s determination that a new generation 
resource must clear only one capacity auction in order to 
avoid further mitigation.  We have considered these 
arguments and find them without merit.  Accordingly, we 
deny the petitions for review.   
 
I. 
 
 At the time the FPA was passed in 1935, “most 
electricity was sold by vertically integrated utilities that had 
constructed their own power plants, transmission lines, and 
local delivery systems.  Although there were some 
interconnections among utilities, most operated as separate, 
local monopolies subject to state or local regulation.”  New 
                                                                                                     
825l(b).  New Jersey, Maryland, Hess Corporation, and Load 
Petitioners filed petitions for review in this Court.  Cross-
Petitioners PJM Power Providers Group and PSEG Energy 
Resources & Trade, LLC (collectively, “P3”) filed petitions 
for review in the D.C. Circuit.  On December 8, 2011, the 
U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated all 
petitions for review in this Court.   
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York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5 (2002).  In 1927 the Supreme 
Court held in Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam 
& Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927), that only Congress, and 
not the states, could regulate the sale of electrical power in 
interstate commerce.  To meet this charge, Congress enacted 
the FPA, which authorized federal regulation of the interstate 
sale of electricity, and created a new independent agency, the 
Federal Power Commission (precursor to FERC), to 
administer the statute.  New York, 535 U.S. at 6-7.  Section 
201 of the FPA defined the Commission’s jurisdiction as “the 
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the 
sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce . . . .”  
16 U.S.C § 824(a).  The statute gave the Commission 
regulatory power over “all facilities for such transmission or 
sale of electric energy”, but withheld jurisdiction over 
“facilities used for the generation of electric energy” which 
remained subject to state and local regulation.  § 824(b)(1).  
Section 205 tasked the Commission with ensuring that “[a]ll 
rates and charges made, demanded or received by any public 
utility for or in connection with the transmission or sale of 
electric energy . . . and all rules and regulations affecting or 
pertaining to such rates or charges shall be just and 
reasonable,” and prohibited utilities engaged in the 
transmission or sale of energy in interstate commerce from 
“mak[ing] or grant[ing] any undue preference or advantage to 
any person or subject[ing] any person to any undue prejudice 
or disadvantage, or [] maintain[ing] any unreasonable 
difference in rates, charges, service, facilities, or in any other 
respect, either as between localities or as between classes of 
service.”  § 824d.  Section 206 gave the Commission the 
power to correct rates, or “any rule, regulation, practice, or 
contract affecting such rate[s]” that it deemed unjust and 
unreasonable.  § 824e(a). 
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 In the nearly eight decades since the FPA was enacted, 
technological advances have revolutionized the way electric 
power is generated and transmitted.  Transmission grids are 
now largely interconnected, which means that “any electricity 
that enters the grid immediately becomes a part of a vast pool 
of energy that is constantly moving in interstate commerce.”  
New York, 535 U.S. at 7.  In addition to making the transfer of 
electricity over long distances more efficient, the 
development of a national, interconnected grid has made it 
possible for a generator in one state to serve customers in 
another, thus opening the door to potential competition that 
did not previously exist.  Id. at 8.  Public utilities still retain 
ownership over transmission lines, however, and so, until 
recently, had the ability to stifle competition from new 
generators by “refus[ing] to deliver energy produced by 
competitors or [by] deliver[ing] competitors’ power on terms 
and conditions less favorable than those they apply to their 
own transmissions.”  Id. at 8-9.  Congress changed this with 
two pieces of legislation—the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”), Pub. L. 95-617, and the 
Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-486.  Respectively, 
those two statutes obligated traditional utilities to purchase 
electricity from “nontraditional facilities,” and authorized 
FERC to order utilities to provide transmission services to 
independent generators.  New York, 535 U.S. at 9.  In 1996, 
FERC issued a landmark ruling requiring the “functional 
unbundling” of wholesale generation and transmission 
services, and requiring utilities to provide open, non-
discriminatory access to their transmission facilities.2
                                              
2 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access 
Non-discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities 
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 In response to the changing conditions in the energy 
market in recent years, FERC has changed its approach to 
regulating rates.  Rather than setting rates for each public 
utility, FERC now seeks to ensure that market-based rates are 
“just and reasonable” largely by overseeing the integrity of 
the interstate energy markets.  See Consol. Edison Co. of 
N.Y., Inc. v. FERC, 347 F.3d 964, 967 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“The 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission oversees this market-
based system pursuant to the Federal Power Act”); La. 
Energy & Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 365 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (“[T]he Commission approves applications to sell 
electric energy at market-based rates only if the seller and its 
affiliates do not have, or adequately have mitigated, market 
power in the generation and transmission of such energy, and 
cannot erect other barriers  
to entry by potential competitors.”).3
                                                                                                     
and Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities, Order 
No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. Preambles ¶ 31,036 (1996), 
aff’d in relevant part, Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. 
v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d sub nom, New 
York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002). 
  
 
3 See also Order Directing Submission of Information with 
Respect to Internal Processes for Reporting Trading Data, 
103 FERC P61,089, ¶ 11 (April 30, 2003) (“This Commission 
has a statutory obligation to ensure the justness and 
reasonableness of rates for wholesale electric power, . . . .  In 
this regard, . . . the Commission’s vision has been to ensure 
the delivery of dependable, affordable energy through 
reliance on sustained competitive markets rather than through 
a rigid adherence to strict-cost-of service principles.”). 
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II.  
 
 A. PJM Interconnection 
 
 Though the grid has become nationally interconnected 
and competition among generators has increased, 
transmission lines for a particular geographic area are still 
typically owned by a single utility company.  To manage the 
complexities of the grid, FERC has encouraged the 
development of “regional transmission organizations,” or 
“RTOs,” which are voluntary associations of the owners of 
transmission lines.  Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576 
F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2009).  RTOs were promoted by 
FERC to increase competition among energy providers by 
ensuring that owners of transmission lines provide access in a 
nondiscriminatory manner.  Midwest ISO Transmission 
Owners v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1361, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 2004).  
Each RTO acts as the system operator in its region, managing 
the transmission grid on behalf of transmission-owning 
member utilities.  See NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165, 169 n.1 (2010).  The parties do 
not dispute that RTOs are “public utilities” under the FPA, 
and are thus subject to FERC’s regulation.   
 
 PJM Interconnection (“PJM”) is the RTO that manages 
the regional transmission system spanning from New Jersey 
west to Chicago and south to North Carolina.  As such, PJM 
governs the transmission of electricity to fifty million 
consumers in thirteen different states and the District of 
Columbia.  One of PJM’s primary responsibilities as system 
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operator is to ensure that there is a sufficient amount of 
electrical capacity within its system to provide reliable 
electricity to its consumers during periods of peak demand.  
“‘Capacity’ is not electricity itself but the ability to produce it 
when necessary.”  Connecticut DPUC v. FERC, 569 F.3d 
477, 479 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  In a reliable transmission system, 
the full potential of the system is used only during periods of 
peak demand.  That means that much of the rest of the time 
there will be generation capacity that is idle.  One of PJM’s 
functions is to ensure that there are enough idle generators 
connected to the transmission grid for the system to function 
at peak load.  It does this by predicting the expected peak load 
three years in advance and then setting a target level of 
capacity.  The member-utilities that sell electricity to end-use 
consumers—known in administrative parlance as “load-
serving entities,” or “LSEs”—are then each responsible for 
providing a proportionate share of the capacity target.   
 
 PJM is also responsible for administering the regional 
markets for energy and energy capacity that have developed 
as competition among generators has increased.  Energy—
that is, actual electricity—is sold wholesale via a “day-ahead 
market” and a “real-time market.”  See Black Oak Energy, 
LLC v. FERC, 725 F.3d 230, 233 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  The term 
for the market mechanism used to determine energy prices in 
each area within the PJM region is “Locational Marginal 
Pricing,” or “LMP.”  Id.   “Under LMP, the price any given 
buyer pays for electricity reflects a collection of costs 
attendant to moving a megawatt of electricity through the 
system to a buyer’s specific location on the grid.”  Id. at 233-
34.  In some areas, the transmission system is more 
“congested”, which means that PJM must dispatch more 
expensive generators to meet the area’s demand.  “The cost of 
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congestion results in different prices at different nodes of the 
system, depending on how congested the wires leading to 
those nodes are.”  Id. at 234. 
 
 Energy capacity, on the other hand, is sold in the PJM 
market at annual capacity auctions, which are the subject of 
this appeal.  Capacity auctions allow LSEs to buy the capacity 
they need to satisfy PJM’s capacity requirements.  Capacity 
auctions also, at least in theory, incentivize the development 
of new generation resources by establishing a market-based 
means by which those resources can recover their investment 
costs.   
 
 Because the energy and energy capacity auctions 
determine the rates for the transmission and sale of energy in 
interstate commerce, they are subject to FERC oversight.  
PJM is therefore obligated to obtain FERC approval of any 
changes it makes to its “tariff,” which is the term of art used 
to refer to the “classifications, practices, and regulations” a 
public utility uses to establish electricity rates.  See 16 U.S.C. 
§ 824d(c).  FERC reviews PJM’s proposed changes to its own 
tariff under § 205 of the FPA to determine whether such 
changes result in rates that are “just and reasonable.”  16 
U.S.C. § 824d(a).  FERC can also make changes to PJM’s 
tariff under § 206 of the FPA, either on its own initiative or 
pursuant to a complaint from a third party, if it determines 
that the rates produced under the tariff are unjust or 
unreasonable.  Id. § 824e(a).  
 
 B. The Reliability Market  
 Prior to 1999, PJM required LSEs that were unable to 
provide sufficient capacity in advance of when it was needed 
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to pay a deficiency charge based on the fixed costs of a new 
generator.  In 1999, PJM modified the reliability requirement 
to allow LSEs to procure capacity up to the day before it was 
needed, while also instituting market opportunities to 
purchase “capacity credits.”  LSEs that failed to obtain 
sufficient capacity in those markets were then subject to the 
deficiency charge.  Those methods soon proved inadequate, 
however, as they resulted in supply insufficiencies and 
volatile capacity prices in certain locations.  In particular, the 
retirement of many aging generators in the mid-Atlantic 
resulted in reliability problems throughout the region, and 
volatile prices made the capacity market ineffective at 
incentivizing development of new generation resources. 
Therefore, in 2000, PJM began negotiating with its 
stakeholders to reform the capacity market.   
 
 In 2006, after a period of extended negotiation, an 
administrative law judge facilitated a settlement that created 
the Reliability Market.  The settlement was approved with 
modification by FERC and incorporated into PJM’s tariff in 
the 2006 Order.  See PJM Interconnection, LLC., 117 FERC ¶ 
61,331 (2006).  Under the FERC-approved tariff that resulted 
from that settlement, all capacity suppliers (i.e., generation 
and transmission resources) that wish to receive a capacity 
payment or satisfy an LSE’s capacity obligation are required 
to offer their available capacity into an auction.4
                                              
4 As discussed herein, some LSEs supply their own 
capacity—that is, they own their own generation resources, 
which they use to fulfill their capacity obligations.  In order to 
have those resources counted toward their capacity 
obligations, however, the LSE must introduce them into the 
auction.  See Initial Order on Reliability Pricing Model, 115 
  Those offers 
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are grouped based on the particular “locational delivery area,” 
or “LDA,” the resource will serve.  Offers are then accepted 
by the auction, or “cleared”, in order of price, starting with 
the lowest price offered, and continuing until there is 
sufficient capacity in the auction to satisfy PJM’s 
requirements for each LDA.  All offers that clear for a given 
LDA are then paid the “clearing price” for that area, which is 
equal to the last offer (i.e., the highest offer) necessary to 
meet the area’s reliability needs as determined by PJM.  The 
auction therefore sets the price that the LSEs will pay for 
capacity in a given area.  Only capacity offers that 
successfully clear the auction can be counted towards an 
LSE’s capacity requirements.  PJM refers to this approach to 
determining the cost of capacity as the “Reliability Pricing 
Model,” or “RPM.”5
                                                                                                     
FERC ¶ 61,079, at ¶ 115 (Apr. 20, 2006) (“To prevent 
physical withholding, all existing generator capacity 
resources have a must offer requirement with regard to all 
unsold capacity.  To encourage compliance with the must 
offer rule, generators that fail to comply in each auction will 
not be allowed to use its [sic] resource to satisfy any capacity 
requirement or receive any capacity payments in the Delivery 
Year.”). 
   
 
5 The price and amount of annual capacity needed for each 
LDA is set using the Variable Resource Requirement 
(“VRR”) Curve, which is a construct meant to mimic a 
demand curve that can show the price PJM expects to pay for 
capacity based on the amount of capacity available in the 
market.  Under the VRR curve, the price for capacity will 
decrease as more supply enters the market, up until the point 
at which PJM’s capacity objective is fully satisfied.  To 
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 Pursuant to the 2006 Order, PJM actually operates two 
types of capacity auctions: “base residual auctions” and 
“incremental auctions.”  See 2006 Order ¶ 55 (Joint App. 
3046-47).  Base residual auctions are held three years in 
advance of when the capacity offered at the auction will be 
needed.  The forward-looking nature of the auctions serves 
two functions: it provides PJM advance assurance that its 
system will be reliable, and it allows new generation 
resources, though not yet complete, to test the market and 
perhaps obtain financing for their construction.  The 
incremental auctions then allow LSEs to purchase additional 
capacity if needed to meet greater-than-expected demand.  
Although both auctions function similarly, the base residual 
auctions are the primary subject of this appeal.        
 
 The capacity auctions are not the only method by 
which LSEs can satisfy their capacity obligations.  If an LSE 
prefers not to participate in the auctions, it can instead utilize 
the “Fixed Resource Requirement” (“FRR”) option, which 
allows an LSE to opt out of the auctions by building or 
directly contracting with generation resources to meet its 
capacity obligations.  To qualify for the FRR option, 
however, the LSE must demonstrate to PJM that it has access 
to sufficient generation and transmission resources to meet 
projected capacity obligations for a five-year period, 
beginning three years in the future.  If it succeeds in doing so, 
the LSE can forego the capacity auctions and pay its 
                                                                                                     
ensure reliability in the transmission system, there must be 
more capacity available than is generally needed by 
consumers.  PJM thus artificially creates the demand for 
capacity, and it now does so via the VRR curve.       
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generation resources whatever price the parties agree to.  
However, if an LSE chooses the FRR option, it loses the 
ability to participate in the auctions during that five-year 
period; it cannot buy additional capacity, nor can it “defray 
the costs of new resources” it builds by offering their excess 
capacity into the auctions.  See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 
135 FERC ¶ 61,022 (Apr. 12, 2011) [hereinafter, “April 12 
Order”] (Joint App. 81-82 n.98).  In other words, participating 
in the FRR option is an all-or-nothing proposition, and 
appeals as a practical matter only to large utilities that still 
follow the traditional, vertically integrated model.6
 In addition to establishing the capacity auctions, the 
2006 Order created several mechanisms designed to prevent 
market manipulation in those auctions.  First, to prevent 
sellers from exercising monopoly power, the 2006 Order 
imposed a rigid price cap on all offers.  Second, the 
settlement provided for a “Minimum Offer Price Rule,” or 
“MOPR,” that is designed to curb monopsony power, i.e., the 
power of a buyer facing many sellers and little to no 
 
 
 
 
 
 C. The Minimum Offer Price Rule 
                                              
6 The record indicates that the FRR was incorporated into the 
2006 Order at the request of American Electric Power (AEP), 
one of the country’s largest utilities, and AEP is the only 
utility that has used the FRR option in recent years. 
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competition from other buyers.7
 Under the original MOPR approved by FERC in the 
2006 Order, offers for capacity were subject to mitigation if 
  The exercise of buyer 
market power is possible in part because many utility 
companies are both buyers and sellers of capacity in the 
capacity auctions.  If, for example, an LSE owns a small 
generator, the LSE must offer that generation capacity into 
the auction in order for it to count towards the LSE’s capacity 
obligation.  To fully satisfy that obligation, however, the 
same LSE may also have to purchase additional capacity from 
the auction.  When such LSEs buy more capacity than they 
offer into the auction, they have an incentive to keep auction 
prices as low as possible.  Theoretically, those net-buyers can 
achieve that objective by offering their capacity at artificially 
low prices that are sure to clear the auction.  Such offers 
crowd out other capacity that is priced at a higher, cost-based 
rate, and thus result in a lower overall clearing price.  To 
counteract that manipulation of the market, the MOPR seeks 
to identify uneconomic offers and “mitigate” them by raising 
them to a price that more accurately approximates their net 
costs.  
 
                                              
7 Technically, a monopolist is a single seller and a 
monopsonist is a single buyer, see Black’s Law Dictionary 
1028 (8th ed. 2004), but the terms are used loosely by the 
parties to mean, respectively, sellers and buyers who exercise 
disproportionate power in imperfectly competitive markets.  
More particularly, they use the term “monopsony” to mean 
net-buyers in the auction who sell into the auction at 
artificially low prices in order to depress the clearing price.  
We adopt that imprecise usage. 
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they failed three “screens”: a conduct screen, an impact 
screen, and an incentive screen (also known as the “net-short 
test”).  The conduct screen identified offers that might be 
artificially low by comparing them to a “threshold” price, 
which was based on PJM’s estimate of the net cost of new 
entry into the market, or net “CONE,” for the relevant LDA.8
                                              
8 Like the VRR Curve, the net CONE is an administrative 
construct.  PJM arrives at the net CONE figure by estimating 
the costs needed to build a particular type of generation 
resource, and then deducting from those costs the estimated 
revenue the new unit would receive through sales of “energy 
and ancillary services”, discussed infra.  In other words, the 
more revenue a new generator is expected to make through 
energy sales, the larger the amount deducted from the costs of 
developing the resource.  For example, if a new resource 
costs $100 to build, and is expected to earn $25 in energy 
sales, its net CONE would be $75.  The net CONE and the 
VRR Curve are also related concepts.  As discussed supra, 
the VRR Curve is meant to demonstrate the change in 
expected capacity prices as the amount of capacity in the 
market increases.  Those expected prices – the “y axis” for a 
curve – are determined by PJM’s estimate of the net CONE 
(the “x axis” being quantity of capacity).   
 
  
PJM determined the estimated net CONE for two types of 
generators—combustion turbines (“CT” generators) and 
combined cycle turbines (“CC” generators)—both of which 
are gas-fired generators.  The threshold price for each of those 
generators was either 70% or 80% of its estimated net CONE 
(depending on the type of resource).  Any offer that was 
below the threshold price would fail the “conduct screen.”   
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 Offers that failed the conduct screen would then be 
subject to the “impact screen,” which was conducted by 
rerunning the auction to determine whether the offer would 
reduce the clearing price by 20% to 30% in the relevant LDA, 
or by $25/MW-day9
 Importantly, however, not all offers were subject to the 
MOPR.  First, the MOPR applied only to new entrants to the 
market, not to existing resources.  Although existing 
resources, like all available capacity, had to be offered into 
the auction, they could be offered at any price below the 
upper limit.  In fact, because existing resources already 
incurred the costs needed to generate capacity, and could thus 
often afford to offer capacity at very low prices, they were 
, whichever was greater.  Put more 
simply, the impact screen determined whether a below-cost 
offer actually affected the clearing price in a substantial way.  
If it did, then the offer would be subjected to the final screen, 
the “net-short test”, in which PJM determined whether the 
seller had an incentive to depress prices.  Specifically, PJM 
would determine whether the seller was in a “net-short 
position”, that is, whether the seller bought substantially more 
capacity from the auction than it sold, and thus had the 
incentive to reduce the clearing price.  An offer that failed all 
three screens would then be “mitigated” by raising it to 80% 
or 90% of the estimated net CONE, depending on the 
resource type.  That adjusted offer could still clear the 
auction, but only if it was at or below the clearing price.   
 
                                              
9 Capacity is measured in megawatt-days (MW-day) and bid 
into the RPM market as a dollar amount per megawatt-day.  
See PPL Energy Plus, LLC. v. Nazarian, Civil Action No. 
MJG-12-1286, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140210, at *43 (D. 
Md. Sept. 30, 2013). 
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permitted to offer their capacity at a price of zero dollars, 
which would ensure that it cleared the auction and received 
the clearing price. The MOPR also did not apply to upgrades 
or additions to existing resources.  Second, certain types of 
resources were never subject to the MOPR, including nuclear, 
coal, and hydroelectric resources.  Third, the MOPR 
exempted from its operation “any planned resource being 
developed in response to a state regulatory or legislative 
mandate to resolve a projected capacity shortfall.”  April 12 
Order ¶ 124 (Joint App. 61-62).  In order for an offer to 
qualify for that exemption, the state’s capacity shortfall had to 
be established “pursuant to a state evidentiary proceeding that 
includes due notice, PJM participation and an opportunity to 
be heard.”  Id.  
 
 The original MOPR also provided special treatment to 
resources designated as “self-supply,” which are capacity 
resources that an LSE builds to serve its own load.  Such a 
resource had to offer its capacity into the auction, and the 
resource had to clear the auction, in order for it to be counted 
toward the LSE’s capacity obligation.  Unlike the three types 
of resources described above, self-supply resources were not 
listed among the exemptions to the MOPR, and so could be 
subject to mitigation if they failed the three screens.  But the 
MOPR went on to state that, after offers were mitigated as 
needed and the clearing price was determined, PJM must 
accept capacity offers in the following order: 
 
(i) first, all Sell Offers in their 
entirety designated as self-supply 
committed regardless of price; (ii) 
then, all Sell Offers of zero . . . 
and (iii) then all remaining Sell 
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Offers in order of the lowest price 
. . . .           
PJM Tariff Attachment DD, Section 5.14(h)(4) (emphasis in 
original).  The MOPR therefore suggested that self-supply 
offers would clear the auction before all other offers, even if 
the self-supply offers were actually higher than the clearing 
price.  In other words, although they were not “exempt” from 
the MOPR, and thus could be mitigated, self-supply offers 
were entitled to what amounted to automatic clearance.10
 In sum, the original MOPR would mitigate first-time 
offers from certain resources that had the potential to 
manipulate the market through the exercise of buyer market 
power.  The original MOPR did not affect resources that were 
built pursuant to a state mandate intended to correct a 
capacity deficiency, and it appeared to allow self-supply 
   
 
 For all resources, the original MOPR only applied the 
first time a resource was offered at an auction, regardless of 
whether it cleared the auction.  Resources that failed to clear 
the first time could therefore be offered at subsequent 
auctions without facing the three screens and potential 
mitigation.            
 
                                              
10 The original MOPR’s treatment of self-supply offers is a 
subject of some disagreement among the parties.  FERC, 
PJM, and Cross-Petitioners P3 claim that the original MOPR 
was ambiguous as to whether there was an exemption for 
self-supply. The Load Petitioners, on the other hand, urge that 
the provision is clear—there was no exemption from 
mitigation, but all self-supply offers would clear the auction.  
We discuss this in detail infra. 
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offers to clear regardless of price.  Notably, during the entire 
period it was in effect, the original MOPR was never 
triggered, meaning that no offer was subject to mitigation.  
 
III. 
 
 A. The New Jersey and Maryland Initiatives 
 The chain of events leading up to FERC’s 2011 Orders 
was set in motion by the efforts of two states—New Jersey 
and Maryland—to invoke the MOPR’s exemption for state-
mandated resources, efforts which, if successful, would result 
in the introduction of thousands of megawatts of subsidized 
capacity into the PJM market.  On January 28, 2011, New 
Jersey Governor Chris Christie signed into law the “Long-
Term Capacity Agreement and Pilot Program” (“LCAPP”), 
2011 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 9 (codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
48:3-98.2 (2011)), which launched a state initiative to 
develop new generation resources.  According to the statute, 
New Jersey faced an “electrical power capacity deficit” due to 
transmission system overloads and aging generation facilities.  
Id. § 48:3-98:2(e), (h).  Because PJM’s “reliability pricing 
model [had] not resulted in large additions of” generation 
facilities or load resources, “the construction of new, efficient 
generation [had to] be fostered by State policy.”  Id. § 48:3-
98.2(b), (d).11
                                              
11 FERC disagrees that the RPM has failed to secure 
sufficient capacity in the PJM region.  See, e.g., “Order on 
Compliance Filing, Rehearing, and Technical Conference.”  
137 FERC ¶ 61,145 (November 17, 2011), ¶ 3 (“[T]he 
evidence before us suggests that RPM has in fact succeeded 
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 Pursuant to the LCAPP, the New Jersey Board of 
Public Utilities would conduct a competitive bidding process, 
in which it would evaluate proposed resources based on their 
“environmental, economic, and community benefits.”  Id. § 
48:3-98.3(b)(2).  Winning bidders would then enter into long-
term contracts with New Jersey’s four electric public utilities, 
pursuant to which they would build new capacity resources in 
exchange for payments at a specified rate.  Id. § 48:3-51; id. § 
48:3-98.3(c)(9).  The new generation resources would be 
required by those contracts to attempt to clear the PJM base 
residual auction.  Id. § 48:3-98.3(c)(12).  Once a resource 
cleared, New Jersey’s public utilities would then pay the 
generators the difference between the contract price and the 
amount they were able to receive from the auction, or if the 
clearing price was higher than the contract price, the 
generators would reimburse the public utilities for the excess 
payment.  Id. at (c)(4).  To ensure that its resources would 
clear, New Jersey intended to offer the capacity into the base 
residual market at a price below their actual cost.   
 
   Spurred to action by similar concerns regarding long-
term reliability needs and the suspension of a key 
transmission project, the Maryland Public Service 
Commission (PSC) in December 2010 released a draft 
Request for Proposals (“RFP”) for Generation Capacity 
Resources Under Long-Term Contract.  The RFP 
contemplated that the PSC would conduct an evidentiary 
hearing to determine whether it would, similarly to New 
Jersey, require Maryland’s electric distribution companies 
                                                                                                     
in securing sufficient capacity to meet reliability requirements 
for the PJM region.”).  (Joint App. 105)  
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(EDCs) to enter into long-term contracts to purchase new 
capacity, or to construct new generation on their own.  After 
the close of briefing in this matter, the PSC did issue a 
Generation Order directing each of three Maryland EDCs to 
contract with Commercial Power Ventures (CPV) Maryland.  
See Nazarian, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *5.  As in New 
Jersey, the Maryland contracts require CPV to sell capacity in 
the PJM markets, and for the EDCs to pay CPV any 
difference between the price received in the market and a pre-
determined contract price.12
                                              
12 We note that, since oral argument in this case, two federal 
district courts have issued decisions invalidating the New 
Jersey and Maryland initiatives on the ground that they seek 
to legislate or regulate wholesale prices for energy in 
interstate commerce, a field occupied exclusively by FERC, 
in violation of the Supremacy Clause.  See generally PPL 
EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, supra; PPL EnergyPlus, LLC 
v. Hanna, Civil Action No. 11-745, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
147273 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2013).  While we are mindful of the 
implications of these decisions on certain issues in this case, 
we deal here with the legality of actions taken by FERC, not 
of those taken by the states.  Accordingly, we do not address 
those decisions. 
 
  Like New Jersey, Maryland 
intended to offer its new capacity resources into the PJM 
market at a price below its actual cost to ensure that they 
would clear. 
 
 B. The P3 Complaint and PJM’s Revisions to the 
MOPR 
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 Shortly after the LCAPP was enacted, an association 
of PJM’s power providers, known as “P3”13
                                              
13 P3 is a nonprofit organization of PJM stakeholders 
consisting of Calpine Corporation; DPL Energy, LLC; Edison 
Mission Group; EquiPower Resources Corp.; Essential 
Power, LLC; Exelon Corp.; GDF SUEZ North America, Inc.; 
Homer City Generation, L.P.; NextEra Energy Resources, 
LLC; NRG Energy Inc.; PPL Corporation; and PSEG Energy 
Resources & Trade LLC (PSEG).  It appears that P3 had a 
slightly different membership when it filed its initial 
complaint with FERC, see April 12 Order ¶ 2 n.4 (Joint App. 
27) (listing members of P3, some of which differ from the 
membership listed in P3’s brief).  However, no party has 
asserted that this apparent membership change has any 
relevance for purposes of our review.  We further note that in 
its brief, despite listing PSEG as a member of P3 in its 
corporate disclosure statement, P3 at various points refers to 
“P3 and PSEG” as if they are distinct from one another.  See, 
e.g., P3 Br. 2, 63.  PSEG also filed its own petition for review 
separate from the other members of P3.  However, because 
PSEG did not file a brief independently from the other 
members of P3, and because PSEG does not appear to make 
any independent arguments in addition to those made by P3, 
we assume for purposes of this opinion that PSEG is a 
member of P3.   
, filed a complaint 
with FERC under § 206 of the FPA, arguing that the MOPR 
implemented in the 2006 Order was not an effective tool for 
curbing buyer market power.  Specifically citing the New 
Jersey and Maryland initiatives, P3 urged that “without 
effective mitigation, the exercise of buyer market power will 
sound the death knell of competitive markets—and with them 
the cost savings that markets create for consumers.”  (Joint 
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App. 204)  Accordingly, P3 urged PJM to eliminate the 
MOPR’s exemption for state-mandated resources. 
 
 P3 also requested other reforms of the MOPR in its 
complaint, all geared toward mitigating buyer-side market 
power: (1) adjustment of the conduct screen so that any offer 
that was less than 100% of the estimated net CONE would 
trigger the MOPR; (2) elimination of the two subsidiary 
screens (the impact screen and the net-short test) entirely; (3) 
elimination of the exemption for self-supply (to the extent 
that one existed); (4) addition of a requirement that a new 
resource successfully clear two auctions before becoming 
exempt from the MOPR; and (5) addition of an exemption to 
the MOPR “for any new resource whose sponsor affirms it 
will not receive any form of out-of-market subsidy or 
preferential treatment by state regulators,” which it called a 
“No-Subsidy Off-Ramp”.  P3 Br. 19. 
 
 On February 11, 2011, in response to P3’s complaint, 
PJM submitted to FERC proposed changes to its tariff that 
had incorporated the original MOPR, under § 205 of the FPA.  
The original MOPR, PJM explained, was designed to 
“address a concern that some market participants might have 
an incentive to depress market clearing prices by offering 
some self-supply at less than a competitive level.”  (Joint 
App. 393 (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Because the 
original MOPR had never been triggered, PJM urged that the 
existing rule was not adequate to serve these purposes.  PJM 
also noted that “state programs intended to support new 
generation entry through out-of-market payments to the 
generator”—like those developed by New Jersey and 
Maryland—had the potential to “raise the price-suppression 
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concerns that MOPR-type provisions are intended to 
address.”  (Id.)   
 
 The reforms PJM proposed differed somewhat from 
the changes P3 suggested, however.  PJM adopted P3’s 
recommendations that the MOPR be amended to eliminate 
the impact screen and the net-short requirement, and “to 
clarify that self-supply offers are subject to the MOPR.” (Id. 
at 411).  According to PJM, self-supply offers were never 
intended to be exempt from the MOPR, and the additional 
screens made the MOPR too lenient and “too easily gamed”.  
(Id. at 406)  PJM also accepted, with some significant 
changes, P3’s proposals that the state-mandated exemption be 
eliminated, that the conduct screen threshold be increased, 
and that a resource be required to clear an auction before 
becoming exempt from the MOPR.  Specifically, (1) rather 
than simply eliminating the state-mandated exemption, PJM 
proposed to amend the MOPR to provide that a resource that 
failed the conduct screen could, via a § 206 filing, justify the 
state program to FERC and seek an individual exemption 
from the MOPR; (2) PJM agreed to increase the conduct 
screen threshold to 90% of the estimated net CONE, rather 
than to 100% of that value, as proposed by P3, explaining that 
net CONE “is merely an estimate,” and that “[a] 90% factor 
strikes the right balance” between granting some wiggle room 
for slightly below-CONE offers and minimizing “the risk that 
a seller can evade the MOPR and use a below-cost price to 
suppress clearing prices for all sellers.”  (Id. at 401-02); (3) 
PJM agreed that a new resource should have to actually clear 
an auction, and not merely participate in one, to become 
exempt from the MOPR in future auctions.  PJM went further 
than P3 requested, however, proposing that a resource be 
required to clear three times before becoming exempt, rather 
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than merely twice.  The only P3 proposal that PJM rejected in 
its entirety was P3’s proposed “No-Subsidy Off-Ramp,” by 
which any new resource could avoid the MOPR by affirming 
that its sponsor had not received an out-of-market subsidy.   
 
 PJM also incorporated several changes to the MOPR 
that P3 had not suggested.  First, it added wind and solar 
resources to the list of resources that would always be 
exempt from the MOPR, and thus could offer their capacity 
at prices as low as zero.  As a result of those additions, the 
MOPR would only apply to new gas-fired facilities.  Second, 
PJM explained for the first time how an offer that fails the 
MOPR can nonetheless avoid mitigation by demonstrating to 
FERC under § 206 that the MOPR screen is unjust and 
unreasonable “as applied to its specific costs and its specific 
revenue expectations.”  (Id. at 404)   
 
 Third, PJM clarified and amended the method used to 
determine the estimated net CONE for each LDA.  Relevant 
here, it defined the method for calculating “energy and 
ancillary services offsets” to be used in determining the 
MOPR trigger threshold for a new resource.14
                                              
14 The original MOPR referred to energy and ancillary 
services offsets, but “never explain[ed] how the energy and 
ancillary service revenues [would] be determined.”  (Joint 
App. 399) 
  Under the 
existing guidelines used to construct the VRR Curve, “PJM 
associate[d] the gross CONE in [an LDA] . . . with the 
energy revenues calculated for a zone within that area.”  (Id. 
at 400)  PJM proposed an approach similar to this 
methodology with one adjustment.  Instead of basing 
revenues on the zone in which a generic “reference resource” 
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was located—the method used in the VRR Curve 
guidelines—PJM would instead use the revenues earned by 
resources in the highest-earning “zone” within the LDA.  In 
other words, all new resources in a given LDA would be 
presumed to have the same earning potential as the highest-
earning generators in the LDA.  PJM was concerned that, if 
the presumed location of a “reference resource” were used to 
determine energy and ancillary services revenues, a new 
entrant might “fail the MOPR screen merely because it is 
located in a zone with higher [marginal prices] than the zone 
in which the hypothetical reference resource was assumed to 
be built.”  (Joint App. 400)  PJM therefore erred on the side 
of allowing more resources to avoid mitigation.  PJM also 
provided that those prices would be based on the prices for 
energy in the “real-time” energy market, as opposed to the 
“day-ahead” market.   
 
 PJM’s tariff revisions prompted numerous comments, 
protests, answers, and cross-answers from interested parties.  
Several states and LSEs argued that “eliminating the state-
mandated exemption and other related MOPR conditions 
would transform [the capacity auctions] from a residual 
market into the primary market for securing new capacity,” 
and would impermissibly interfere with legitimate state 
policies.  (Petitioners/Cross Respondents’ Joint Statements 
17-18)  Similarly, several municipal and rural cooperative 
utility companies “protested that eliminating automatic 
clearance for self-supply resources would undermine their 
traditional business models.”  (Id. at 18)  PJM responded to 
those protests in two filings with FERC in March of 2011, 
but it did not propose any further revisions to the MOPR.   
 
 C. FERC’s MOPR Orders 
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 On April 12, 2011, FERC issued the April 12 Order, 
accepting, with some modifications, PJM’s revised tariff as 
“just and reasonable.”  135 FERC ¶ 61,022 (2011).  FERC 
agreed with PJM that it was just and reasonable to: (1) 
calculate energy and ancillary services revenues in the 
manner PJM proposed (using real-time energy prices and the 
highest-priced zones within an LDA); (2) raise the conduct 
screen to 90% of the estimated net CONE; (3) eliminate the 
net-short screen and the impact screen; (4) add exemptions 
for wind and solar generation resources; and (5) clarify that 
self-supply resources are subject to the MOPR.  FERC 
disagreed, however, with three components of the revised 
MOPR: (1) the method by which a resource can obtain an 
individual exemption to the MOPR; (2) the replacement for 
the state-mandated exemption; and (3) the number of 
auctions a resource must clear before becoming exempt from 
the MOPR.   
 
 With regard to individual exemptions to the MOPR, 
FERC found unjust and unreasonable PJM’s proposal to 
require parties to submit at the outset a § 206 filing with 
FERC to demonstrate that a sell offer was consistent with the 
project’s costs.  FERC agreed that offers that were in fact 
competitive and cost-based should not be mitigated, but it 
found unreasonable the “complex and lengthy litigation” that 
could result from the § 206 review process.  Instead, FERC 
directed PJM to modify the tariff to provide that PJM and its 
Independent Market Monitor would review such cost 
justifications.15
                                              
15 Despite numerous references to the Independent Market 
Monitor in their briefing, the parties have not done the Court 
  Put more simply, FERC wanted PJM, not 
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FERC, to conduct the review process.  FERC concluded that, 
with the unit-specific cost review process in place, P3’s 
proposed “No-Subsidy Off-Ramp” was unnecessary.   
 
 As for the state-mandated exemption, FERC agreed in 
part with PJM, concluding that the exemption needed to be 
eliminated due to “mounting evidence of risk from what was 
previously only a theoretical weakness in the MOPR rules,” 
namely, that state-subsidized resources would suppress 
auction prices.  April 12 Order ¶ 139 (Joint App. 66).  FERC 
disagreed with PJM’s proposed replacement mechanism, 
however.  Specifically, it declined to adopt a formal process 
for a state to justify its initiative and thus obtain an 
exemption from the MOPR.  FERC explained that states, like 
all parties, were free to file for an exemption from the MOPR 
under § 206.  But FERC concluded that there was no need for 
a review process like the one PJM had proposed, which 
would have balanced the state’s interests against the adverse 
price effects of below-cost offers, because “there is no valid 
state interest” in ensuring that uneconomic offers would clear 
the auction.  Id. at ¶ 142 (Joint App. 68).  Accordingly, 
FERC declined to accord states an opportunity to justify their 
initiatives on policy grounds, instead removing the state 
exemption and requiring them to submit cost-based offers 
like other entrants or suffer the consequences of mitigation.  
              
                                                                                                     
the favor of explaining the precise role of this entity.  
Intervenor First Energy Solutions Corp. helpfully describes 
the Independent Market Monitor as “a neutral entity that 
monitors compliance with PJM’s market rules.”  (FirstEnergy 
Br. 12)    
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 Finally, FERC rejected PJM’s proposal that the MOPR 
be applied to a given resource until that resource has cleared 
the auction three times.  Instead, FERC concluded that the 
MOPR should apply only until a resource clears an auction 
once, because by clearing one auction “the resource 
demonstrates that its capacity is needed by the market at a 
price near its full entry cost . . . .”  Id. at ¶ 176 (Joint App. 
76).  In so concluding, FERC partially adopted a 
recommendation submitted by the Independent Market 
Monitor.  FERC rejected the second component of the 
Independent Market Monitor’s proposal, however, which 
would have continued to impose the MOPR in later auctions 
unless the resource could “show it is not receiving 
discriminatory subsidies.”  Id. at ¶ 177 (Joint App. 77).  
FERC declined to adopt that requirement because “even if 
discriminatory subsidies are being received, if the resource is 
needed at the MOPR bid then it is a competitive resource and 
should be permitted to participate in the auction regardless of 
whether it also receives a subsidy.”  Id.  On May 12, 2011, 
PJM submitted a compliance filing that responded to FERC’s 
instructions in the April 12 Order.   
 
 Following FERC’s ruling, numerous parties sought 
rehearing.  In response to those requests, FERC convened a 
technical conference on July 28, 2011, to explore the issues 
raised on rehearing, specifically on issues regarding the 
MOPR’s applicability to self-supply.  After the technical 
conference, parties submitted formal comments for FERC to 
consider.   
 
 On November 17, 2011, FERC issued an “Order on 
Compliance Filing, Rehearing, and Technical Conference.”  
137 FERC ¶ 61,145 (November 17, 2011) [hereinafter, 
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“November 17 Order”].  Although that order slightly 
modified some of the revisions approved in its April 12 
Order, FERC did not change its fundamental position on any 
of the issues relevant to this appeal.  Rather, it reaffirmed its 
commitment to its initial reaction to the revised tariff, 
explaining that, although the capacity auctions had generally 
been successful since their adoption, the MOPR had to be 
amended to prevent “subsidized entry supported by one 
state’s or locality’s policies” from “disrupting the 
competitive price signals [the auction] is designed to produce 
. . . .”  November 17 Order ¶ 3 (Joint App. 105-06).  FERC 
emphasized that offers that fail the conduct screen (that is, 
appear to be below-cost) have two options for avoiding 
mitigation: they can appeal to PJM through the unit-specific 
cost justification process or they can seek an exemption from 
FERC by using § 206 of the FPA.  FERC further explained 
that if an LSE does not want to be subject to the MOPR at 
all, it can utilize the FRR option.  FERC therefore continued 
to find the majority of the revisions approved in the April 12 
Order “just and reasonable.”   
 
 Several parties sought rehearing of FERC’s November 
17 Order, which FERC denied on March 15, 2012.  See 
“Order on Rehearing”, PJM Interconnection, LLC, 138 
FERC ¶ 61,194 (March 15, 2012) [hereinafter “March 15 
Order”]. 
 
 D. Petitions for Review 
 
43 
 
 Numerous parties have timely petitioned for review of 
the 2011 Orders. 16  Specifically, Petitioners in this appeal are 
the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities and the New Jersey 
Division of Rate Counsel (collectively, “New Jersey”), the 
Maryland Public Service Commission (“Maryland”), a group 
of governmentally-owned utilities and rural cooperative 
utilities referred to as the “Load Petitioners”17, and Hess 
Corporation (“Hess”).  Intervening on those Petitioners’ 
behalf is CPV Power Development, Inc., which is the parent 
corporation of two companies that have received contracts 
from New Jersey and Maryland to build new generation 
resources.  In addition, P3 has filed a cross-petition 
challenging various aspects of the Orders.   A group of 
energy generation companies has also intervened on Cross-
Petitioners’ behalf.18
                                              
16 All Petitioners and Cross-Petitioners challenge the April 12 
and November 17 Orders.  Load Petitioners additionally 
challenge the March 15 Order.   
 
17 Specifically, the Load Petitioners are Old Dominion 
Electric Cooperative, American Public Power Association, 
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, North 
Carolina Electric Membership Corporation, Delaware 
Municipal Electric Corporation, American Municipal Power, 
Inc., and Southern Maryland Electric Cooperative, Inc.   
 
  Both PJM and FirstEnergy Solutions 
18 Those companies are PPL Electric Utilities Corporation; 
PPL EnergyPlus, LLC; PPL Brunner Island, LLC; PPL 
Holtwood, LLC; PPL Martins Creek, LLC; PPL Mountour, 
LLC; PPL Susquehanna, LLC; Lower Mount Bethel Energy, 
LLC; PPL New Jersey Solar, LLC; PPL New Jersey Biogas, 
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Corp., another energy provider (“FirstEnergy”) have 
intervened on FERC’s behalf.    
 
 As discussed infra, Petitioners and Cross-Petitioners 
challenge different provisions of the MOPR.  Petitioners take 
issue with: (1) the elimination of the exemption for state-
mandated resources; (2) FERC’s decision that the MOPR did 
not provide for automatic clearance for self-supply offers; 
and (3) the addition of solar and wind-powered generators to 
the list of resources that are exempt from the MOPR.   
 
 Cross-Petitioners, on the other hand, challenge: (1) the 
policy of basing the calculation for energy and ancillary 
services offsets on the zone with the highest revenues; and 
(2) the policy of exempting resources from the MOPR once 
they have cleared only one capacity auction. 
 
 Cross-Petitioners’ Petition for Review originally 
challenged three additional components of the revised 
MOPR: (1) the decision to set the conduct screen at 90% of 
estimated net CONE, rather than 100%; (2) the use of real-
time prices, rather than day-ahead prices, in calculating 
energy and ancillary services offsets; and (3) the rejection of 
the “No-Subsidy Off-Ramp” proposal.  Since this petition 
was filed, however, FERC has further altered the MOPR to 
effectively adopt P3’s positions on these issues.19
                                                                                                     
LLC; PPL Renewable Energy, LLC; and Electric Power 
Supply Association. 
  After 
19 See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 138 FERC ¶ 61,062, at ¶¶ 
17, 67, 144 (Jan. 30, 2012) (approving a change in 
methodology for calculating revenues to determine net CONE 
to consider day-ahead prices); PJM Interconnection, LLC, 
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determining that the existence of these provisions did not 
cause any economic harm to them in the 2011 and 2012 
annual auctions, P3 no longer seeks redress on these points.    
 
 In addition to these changes, in a May 2, 2013 Order 
[hereinafter, the “2013 Order”], FERC also provided, for the 
first time, a limited exemption from MOPR mitigation for 
resources designated as self-supply. Rather than merely 
providing for guaranteed clearing for self-supply resources, 
which Load Petitioners argue existed under the 2006 MOPR, 
FERC’s 2013 Order finds just and reasonable PJM’s proposal 
to completely exempt self-supply from mitigation, subject to 
net-short and net-long tests.20
                                                                                                     
143 FERC ¶ 61,090 (May 2, 2013), at ¶ 24 (approving PJM’s 
proposal to exempt from mitigation resources that do not 
receive out-of-market subsidies) and ¶¶ 183, 195 (approving 
PJM’s proposal to increase MOPR benchmark values to 
100% of net CONE). 
20 Again, a “net-short” position “refers to the circumstance 
where an LSE owns and/or contracts for an amount of 
capacity . . . that is less than its capacity needs . . . .”.  On the 
other hand, a “net-long” position “refers to the circumstance 
where an LSE owns or contracts for generation in excess of 
its capacity needs . . . .”  2013 Order ¶ 25 n.19.   
  In other words, if a sponsor 
LSE introduces new self-supply but can demonstrate that it is 
not a net buyer of capacity (and therefore does not have an 
incentive to artificially lower the clearing price), the self-
supply will be exempt from mitigation under the MOPR.  
This new rule, in essence, enables self-supply resources to be 
“price-takers”, i.e., new self-supply resources may be entered 
into the auction at artificially low costs, with the expectation 
that they not be the most costly offer, and therefore will not 
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set the clearing price.  Rather, they will take whatever 
clearing price results from the auction.  It does not appear that 
the Load Petitioners have sought rehearing on this issue. 
 
IV. 
 
 This Court reviews FERC Orders under § 313(b) of the 
FPA, 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b) and § 10(e) of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).  Under the FPA, 
FERC’s factual findings are determinative as long as they are 
supported by substantial evidence. 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b).  The 
“substantial evidence” standard “‘requires more than a 
scintilla, but can be satisfied by something less than a 
preponderance of the evidence.’”  La. PSC v. FERC, 522 F.3d 
378, 395 (D.C. Cir. 2008); accord Mars Home for Youth v. 
NLRB, 666 F.3d 850, 853 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Substantial 
evidence is more than a mere scintilla.  It means such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion.” (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted)).  If the evidence is susceptible to more than one 
rational interpretation, we must uphold the agency’s 
determination.  Fla. Mun. Power Agency v. FERC, 315 F.3d 
362, 368 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“The question we must answer . . . 
is not whether record evidence supports [petitioner]’s version 
of events, but whether it supports FERC’s.”).   
 
 In reviewing FERC’s orders, the Court must determine 
“whether a rational basis exists for a conclusion, whether 
there has been an abuse of discretion, or . . . whether the 
Commission’s order is arbitrary or capricious or not in 
accordance with the purpose of the [FPA].”  Cities of Newark 
v. FERC, 763 F.2d 533, 545 (3d Cir. 1985) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  “‘We affirm the Commission’s orders so 
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long as FERC examined the relevant data and articulated a 
rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
made.’”  Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. FERC, 616 F.3d 520, 
528 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Alcoa Inc. v. FERC, 564 F.3d 
1342, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal alterations omitted)).  
FERC’s decisions regarding wholesale rate issues are entitled 
to broad deference.  See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. 
Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 532 (2008) (“The 
statutory requirement that rates be ‘just and reasonable’ is 
obviously incapable of precise judicial definition, and we 
afford great deference to the Commission in its rate 
decisions.”);  Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FERC, 632 F.3d 
1283, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[B]ecause issues of rate design 
are fairly technical and, insofar as they are not technical, 
involve policy judgments that lie at the core of the regulatory 
mission, our review of whether a particular rate design is just 
and reasonable is highly deferential.” (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted)); see also N. Penn. Gas Co. v. 
FERC, 707 F.2d 763, 766 (3d Cir. 1983) (FERC’s exercise of 
its expertise carries “a presumption of validity”). 
 
 Under § 205 of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. § 824d, public 
utilities may change their rates unilaterally, upon 60 days’ 
notice to FERC, which then reviews the changed rates to 
ensure that they are “just and reasonable.”  It is not necessary, 
in a filing pursuant to        § 205, that FERC find that the 
previous rate was unjust or unreasonable.  See Atl. City Elec. 
Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 9-10 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (with respect 
to a filing under § 205, “FERC plays ‘an essentially passive 
and reactive role.’”) (quoting City of Winnfield v. FERC, 744 
F.2d 871, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).  In contrast, under § 206, 
FERC may change a rate in response to a complaint or on its 
own motion, only if the moving party demonstrates that the 
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existing rate is unjust and unreasonable and the proposed 
alternative is just and reasonable.  16 U.S.C. § 824e. 
 
 A. Petitioners’ Arguments 
 
  1. The Elimination of the Exemption for 
State-Mandated Resources 
 
 State Petitioners’ attack on the elimination of the 
exemption for state-mandated resources contains two 
overarching arguments: (1) that the MOPR changes amount 
to direct regulation of generating facilities, which FERC is 
prohibited from doing under § 201 of the FPA; and (2) that 
FERC erred in approving PJM’s elimination of the state-
mandated exemption as just and reasonable by failing to 
sufficiently explain its reasons for departing from the 2006 
Order, which arbitrarily and capriciously denies the exception 
upon which they had relied.  We address each of these in turn. 
 
   a. FERC’s Jurisdiction 
 
 New Jersey Petitioners urge that, by eliminating the 
state-mandated exemption, FERC effectively attempts to 
substitute its own power supply preferences for those of the 
states and LSEs in violation of § 201 of the FPA, which 
provides that states retain authority over “facilities used for 
the generation of electric energy”.  See 16 U.S.C.          § 
824(b)(1).  New Jersey asserts that FERC’s elimination of the 
state-mandated exemption thus goes “beyond protecting the 
wholesale rates against the effects of” the entry of 
uneconomic resources, and instead “seeks to prevent the entry 
itself.”  N.J. Br. 24.  Relatedly, New Jersey argues that in 
mandating that state-sponsored capacity resources clear based 
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on cost and cost alone, FERC has usurped the state’s right to 
rely on integrated resource planning.  The state argues that 
cost should not be the only permissible consideration in 
choosing among capacity suppliers because “[t]echnology 
and fuel diversity are essential to ensuring that customers 
avoid both price and reliability risks from over-dependence 
on a single supply input.”  N.J. Reply Br. 4-5.   
 
 FERC responds that the FPA bestows on it broad 
authority over rules affecting wholesale rates.  It argues that 
courts have consistently upheld its jurisdiction over its 
“regulation of capacity markets, including charges, 
requirements, and market rules, as practices ‘affecting’ rates . 
. . .”  FERC Br. 40.  In the FERC Orders at issue in this 
action, FERC repeatedly asserts jurisdiction to review PJM’s 
proposed change to the state-mandated exemption as a rule 
affecting prices paid for energy in interstate commerce.  See, 
e.g., April 12 Order ¶ 143 (Joint App. 68) (“Because below-
cost entry suppresses capacity prices and because the 
Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale rates, 
the deterrence of uneconomic entry falls within the 
Commission’s jurisdiction, and we are statutorily mandated to 
protect the RPM against the effects of such entry.”); 
November 17 Order ¶ 89 (Joint App. 130) (“[T]he MOPR 
does not interfere with states or localities that, for policy 
reasons, seek to provide assistance for new capacity entry if 
they believe such expenditures are appropriate for their state.  
We seek only to ensure the reasonableness of the wholesale, 
inter-state prices determined in the markets PJM 
administers.”).   
 
 Under the APA, we are charged with reviewing 
whether an agency action is “in excess of statutory 
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jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory 
right”.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).  The Supreme Court recently 
confirmed that an agency’s assertion of jurisdiction is entitled 
to Chevron deference.  See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 
U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868-69 (2013).   
 
 After reviewing the FERC Orders at issue here and the 
relevant case law, we conclude that FERC did not exceed its 
jurisdiction in eliminating the state-mandated provision.  
Under the FPA, FERC has jurisdiction over rules affecting 
the rates of the transmission or sale of energy in interstate 
commerce.  See 16 U.S.C. § 824d.  Here, it is undisputed that 
New Jersey and Maryland’s plans to introduce thousands of 
megawatts of new capacity into the Base Residual Auction 
would have had an effect on the prices of wholesale electric 
capacity in interstate commerce.  See Mississippi Power & 
Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 374 (1988) (holding, 
among other things, that FERC had jurisdiction over power 
allocations that affect wholesale rates, and stating that 
“[s]tates may not regulate in areas where FERC has properly 
exercised its jurisdiction to determine just and reasonable 
wholesale rates or to insure that agreements affecting 
wholesale rates are reasonable.”) (emphasis added); 
Municipalities of Groton v. FERC, 587 F.2d 1296, 1302 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978) (rejecting jurisdictional challenge to FERC’s 
authority to levy deficiency charges on utilities that failed to 
procure generating capacity sufficient to meet its load 
requirements, and stating that, “[i]t is sufficient for 
jurisdictional purposes that the deficiency charge affects the 
fee that a participant pays for power and reserve service, 
irrespective of the objective underlying that charge.”).   
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 In Connecticut Department of Utility Control v. FERC, 
569 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 2009), the Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit rejected a similar argument to the one New 
Jersey makes here with respect to the New England capacity 
market.  In that case, the Connecticut Department of Public 
Utility Control (“DPUC”) challenged FERC’s authority to 
require it to obtain specific amounts of capacity and to adjust 
resource offer prices to levels where the supply of available 
capacity meets the pre-determined demand.  Id. at 480.21
 The court rejected Connecticut DPUC’s claim that 
FERC’s approval of the capacity requirement imposed by the 
ISO-NE (the New England area’s equivalent to PJM) 
amounted to direct regulation of generation facilities.  First, 
the court pointed out that the mechanism did not actually 
require the installation of additional capacity at all; rather, it 
merely set a peak demand estimate, and employed market 
forces to locate a price at which market incentives were 
sufficient to meet that demand.  Id. at 481-82.  State and local 
authorities retained control over their power plants, including, 
  The 
Connecticut DPUC argued that any movement upward in the 
capacity requirement mandated by the New England-area 
RTO amounted to a requirement that LSEs install new 
capacity, and therefore contravened Section 201 of the FPA, 
which states that FERC “shall not have jurisdiction . . . over 
facilities used for the generation of electric energy.”  Id. at 
481 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) 
(citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1)).   
 
                                              
21 As in the instant matter, New England’s Forward Capacity 
Market, like the Reliability Market at issue here, was the 
result of a settlement among power system stakeholders.  
Connecticut DPUC, 569 F.3d at 481. 
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among other things, forbidding new entrants from providing 
new capacity, limiting new construction, and requiring 
retirement of existing generators, without interference from 
FERC.  Id. at 481.  However, states were still required to 
shoulder the economic consequences of their choices—
decisions to limit the amount of capacity in the market in turn 
affected the market clearing price for capacity.  Id.   
 
 In addition, the court pointed out that FERC was not 
seeking to impose a capacity requirement at all.  Rather, 
FERC was merely seeking to “ensure that the capacity 
charges actually imposed by ISO-NE are fair to suppliers and 
consumers.  That reasonable concerns about system adequacy 
might factor into the fairness of those charges is precisely 
what brings them within the heartland of [FERC’s] 
jurisdiction.”  Id. at 483.  In other words, FERC had the duty 
to ensure that the mechanism employed by the ISO-NE to 
determine the clearing price would yield rates that were just 
and reasonable.  Because ISO-NE’s preferred mechanism 
employed a capacity requirement, FERC was within its 
jurisdiction in reviewing and approving that capacity 
requirement.    
 
 New Jersey attempts to distinguish Connecticut 
Department of Utility Control, urging that, in that case, FERC 
“did not seek to dictate which resources LSEs used to fulfill 
their capacity obligations,”  N.J. Br. 26 (emphasis in 
original), while here, FERC is preventing New Jersey from 
using the resources it has chosen to promote.  But FERC is 
doing no such thing.  The states may use any resource they 
wish to secure the capacity they need.  The elimination of the 
state-mandated exemption means only that if the states wish 
to use a new generation resource to satisfy their capacity 
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obligations required under the Reliability Pricing Model, the 
resource must clear the Base Residual Auction at or near its 
net cost of new entry.  Such a requirement ensures that the 
new resource is economical—i.e., that it is needed by the 
market—and ensures that its sponsor cannot exercise market 
power by introducing a new resource into the auction at a 
price that does not reflect its costs and that has the effect of 
lowering the auction clearing price.  Furthermore, even if the 
states’ preferred generation resources fail to clear the auction, 
the states are free to use them anyway; the only caveat is that 
the states cannot use the resources to offset their capacity 
obligations in the RPM, as such obligations can only be 
satisfied by resources that are demanded by the capacity 
market at a price reflecting their cost.   Thus, as in 
Connecticut Department of Utility Control, New Jersey and 
Maryland are free to make their own decisions regarding how 
to satisfy their capacity needs, but they “will appropriately 
bear the costs of [those] decision[s],” id. at 481, including 
possibly having to pay twice for capacity. 22
                                              
22 New Jersey also cites Maine Public Utilities Commission v. 
FERC, 520 F.3d 464 (D.C. Cir. 2008) for the point that 
FERC’s jurisdiction to approve the capacity requirements in 
the New England market depended on the fact that LSEs were 
free to satisfy their capacity obligations by building their own 
capacity or entering into long-term bilateral contracts.  N.J. 
Reply Br. 11 n.23.  But there is no indication in Maine Public 
Utilities Commission that this was essential to FERC’s 
jurisdiction in that case.  Indeed, the court in Maine Public 
Utilities Commission noted that “[t]he protracted litigation 
over Must-Run agreements, the locational installed capacity 
market, and the Forward Market is fundamentally a dispute 
over the rates that will be paid to suppliers of capacity”, a 
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 FERC’s enumerated reasons for approving the 
elimination of the state-mandated exception relate directly to 
the wholesale price for capacity, which is squarely, and 
indeed exclusively, within FERC’s jurisdiction.  See id. at 
484 (“Where capacity decisions about an interconnected bulk 
power system affect FERC-jurisdictional transmission rates 
for that system without directly implicating generation 
facilities, they come within the Commission’s authority.”).23
                                                                                                     
concern squarely within FERC’s jurisdiction.  Me. PUC, 520 
F.3d at 479. 
  
 
23 The remaining cases cited by New Jersey do not dictate 
otherwise.  Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy 
Resources Conservation & Development Commission, 461 
U.S. 190 (1983) dealt with a state’s authority to halt the 
construction of new nuclear plants for environmental reasons.  
While noting the multiple aspects of power generation over 
which states retained control, the Court specifically excepted 
“the broad authority of the . . . Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, over the need for and pricing of electrical power 
transmitted in interstate commerce. . . .”  Id. at 205.  Nor is 
Otter Tail Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 473 
F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1973), helpful to New Jersey’s argument, 
as FERC is not requiring the state to enlarge its generating 
facilities or to purchase standby facilities.  Finally, FERC’s 
opinion in Ameren Energy Marketing Co., 96 FERC ¶ 61,306 
(Sept. 14, 2001) is in no way contrary to our holding here.  In 
that opinion, FERC clarified that its previous order approving 
market-based rates in a contract for the sale of capacity 
between affiliates did not preclude the Missouri Public 
Service Commission from inquiring into the reasonableness 
of the public utility’s decision to enter into the contract with 
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New Jersey Petitioners argue that, unlike in Connecticut 
DPUC, “FERC here interferes directly and materially with 
state efforts to sponsor new capacity resources precisely 
because those efforts could affect market prices.”  N.J. Reply 
Br. 15.  New Jersey Petitioners are wrong; what FERC has 
actually done here is permit states to develop whatever 
capacity resources they wish, and to use those resources to 
any extent that they wish, while approving rules that prevent 
the state’s choices from adversely affecting wholesale 
capacity rates.24
                                                                                                     
its affiliate.  The language in Ameren that “wholesale 
ratemaking does not, as a general matter, determine whether a 
purchaser has prudently chosen from among available supply 
options”, meant simply that FERC does not dictate the 
particular supplier from which a buyer must purchase 
capacity. 
  Such action falls squarely within FERC’s 
jurisdiction.   
 
24 Cross-Petitioners P3 urge that “affecting capacity rates is 
precisely what New Jersey and Maryland intended to do” 
with their state initiatives.  See P3 Br. 66 and n.16.  It is not 
necessary for us to pass upon whether the states’ intention 
was valid, as neither New Jersey nor Maryland contest that 
their initiatives would affect clearing prices in the base 
residual auction.  The states’ intent is not relevant for 
purposes of FERC’s jurisdiction or the reasonableness of the 
agency’s actions.  See November 17 Order ¶ 3 (Joint App. 
105-06) (“Our intent is not to pass judgment on state and 
local policies and objectives with regard to the development 
of new capacity resources or unreasonably interfere with 
those objectives.  We are forced to act, however, when 
subsidized entry supported by one state’s or locality’s policies 
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   b. Whether the Elimination of the 
State-mandated Exemption  was Arbitrary and Capricious 
 
 Having concluded that accepting PJM’s elimination of 
the state-mandated exemption was within FERC’s 
jurisdiction, we now turn to whether the agency has 
adequately justified its reasoning for rescinding the 
exemption it previously deemed “just and reasonable” at the 
very moment states began to make use of it.   
 
 As an initial matter, New Jersey claims a procedural 
defect in FERC’s elimination of the state-mandated 
exemption.  New Jersey urges that FERC improperly 
eliminated the exemption as part of its review process under 
the guise of § 205, whereas this effected a change that could 
only be accomplished under § 206 based on a finding that the 
prior provision was “unjust and unreasonable.”  Because PJM 
did not actually propose to eliminate the exemption entirely—
but just made it subject to FERC review—New Jersey urges, 
FERC could not accept one part without the other. 
 
 FERC responds that it was correct in applying the § 
205 “just and reasonable” standard to each part of PJM’s 
proposal—both the elimination of the existing exemption and 
PJM’s proposed replacement mechanism—and was therefore 
entitled to accept the former and reject the latter.  Moreover, 
the elimination of PJM’s provision for FERC to assess the 
adequacy of a state’s procedures was inconsequential since 
the right to petition the Commission under § 206 for an 
                                                                                                     
has the effect of disrupting the competitive price signals that 
PJM’s RPM is designed to produce, and that PJM as a whole, 
including other states, rely on to attract sufficient capacity.”). 
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exemption from the rules was preserved in any event as a 
statutory right.  We agree with FERC because the agency’s 
refusal to adopt PJM’s replacement mechanism does not limit 
states in any way that they would not otherwise be limited if 
FERC had accepted PJM’s proposal in full.  But in any case, 
we need not decide whether FERC is entitled to parse a 
particular proposal contained in a tariff filing and analyze 
each part under § 205’s “just and reasonable” standard 
because, as we explain below, we hold that FERC acted 
reasonably in eliminating the state-mandated exemption 
under either § 205 or § 206.   
 
 New Jersey and Maryland strenuously object to the 
elimination of the state-mandated exemption as arbitrary and 
capricious and an unjustified departure from the terms of the 
2006 settlement that created the Reliability Pricing Model.  
New Jersey insists that “fostering development of the selected 
[state-mandated] resources would address New Jersey’s 
reliability concerns while furthering the state’s environmental 
and economic goals.”  N.J. Br. 6; see also Md. Br. at 6 
(“[T]he Maryland PSC submitted extensive, uncontested 
evidence” regarding the state’s “serious and significant long-
term reliability needs . . . .”).  It is necessary, the states argue, 
that these new resources be offered into PJM’s auction at 
below-cost prices to ensure that they will clear.  New Jersey 
Petitioners claim that the new, gas-fired resources it seeks to 
build are needed to address New Jersey’s capacity deficiency, 
and are “valuable enough to warrant long-term contracts even 
if the resources might not be—in the short run—the cheapest 
options available.”  Id. at 8.  In other words, the states 
acknowledge that their selected resources might not be 
economic—that is, they might not be able to clear the PJM 
auction if offered at a price reflecting cost.  Nevertheless, the 
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states assert that the new capacity they seek to build is 
justified, arguing that new resources “are developed for many 
reasons, including meeting non-cost environmental, siting and 
infrastructure goals.”  N.J. Reply Br. 13 n.26; see also Md. 
Reply Br. 6 (“FERC’s refusal to consider . . . non-cost factors 
. . . constitutes arbitrary and capricious decision-making.”).   
 
 Despite its admission that the new generating plants it 
seeks to build may not be the lowest cost option, New Jersey 
persuasively argues that “every fact that FERC identifies as 
rendering the existing tariff unjust and unreasonable was 
present when FERC approved the state exemption.”  N.J. Br. 
at 21.  Though FERC cites the New Jersey and Maryland 
initiatives as evidence that the possibility of price suppression 
as a result of the state-mandated exemption was no longer 
merely “theoretical”, FERC does not explain why it failed 
initially to foresee that providing state-mandated resources 
with an exemption to the MOPR would lead states to 
structure their contracts in a way that would result in the 
suppression of clearing prices.25
                                              
25 When the original state exemption was adopted, P3 
members raised the possibility that states would mandate new 
reliability projects that could reduce clearing prices far below 
cost and urged that the MOPR did not sufficiently address 
this problem.  (Joint App. 2993)  Opponents also discussed 
pending efforts by the state of Connecticut to procure new 
capacity, which was to be bid into New England’s capacity 
market at low, subsidized prices.  (Id. at 2478-79)  These 
facts demonstrate that FERC was aware of possible price 
suppression concerns relating to the state exemption, but 
nonetheless found PJM’s tariff, including the exemption, just 
and reasonable.  (Id. at 2480-81) 
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 Though we are not unsympathetic to New Jersey’s and 
Maryland’s arguments that they reasonably relied on the 
availability of the state-mandated exemption in contracting 
for the construction of new capacity resources, we find no 
fault with FERC’s ability to, and reasons for, eliminating the 
state-mandated exemption.  Courts have repeatedly held that 
an agency may alter its policies despite the absence of a 
change in circumstances.  See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of 
United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 57 (1983) (“‘An agency’s view of what is in the 
public interest may change, either with or without a change in 
circumstances.’”) (quoting Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. 
FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).  Accordingly, in 
reviewing FERC’s action here, we ask only whether FERC’s 
factual conclusions were based on substantial evidence, 
whether, taking into account that evidence, each of the 
changes it made to the MOPR in its orders had a rational 
basis and were not arbitrary or capricious, and whether FERC 
adequately explained its reasoning.  See Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 567 F.3d 659, 669 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) (“[T]he existence of contrary agency precedent gives 
us no more power than usual to question the Commission’s 
substantive determinations.  We still ask only whether the 
Commission has adequately explained the reasons for its 
current action and whether those reasons themselves reflect a 
‘clear error of judgment.’”) (quoting DirecTV v. FCC, 110 
F.3d 816, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).  See also Elec. Consumers 
Res. Council v. FERC, 407 F.3d 1232, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(court’s deference to FERC on complex rate market design 
“is based on the understanding that the Commission will 
monitor its experiment and review it accordingly.”).     
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 With our limited scope of review in mind, we conclude 
that FERC sufficiently explained its reasoning for eliminating 
the state-mandated exemption as unjust and unreasonable.  
FERC’s decision rested mainly upon the “mounting evidence 
of risk” that the state-mandated exemption could permit 
uneconomic entry into the RPM capacity market.  Such 
“mounting evidence” was sufficient, FERC said, to cause the 
agency to reconsider its prior approval of the exemption in 
the 2006 RPM settlement.  See FERC Br. 50:  
 
Thus, the actual prospect of 
thousands of megawatts of new 
generation, developed under 
arrangements that would 
explicitly subsidize the resources 
regardless of Auction price, 
potentially being offered into the 
Reliability Market at a zero bid 
brought into focus the distortive 
effect—no longer “theoretical”—
that the state exemption could 
have on market prices for all 
capacity.   
 
  In the April 12 Order, FERC explained that “[b]ecause 
below-cost entry suppresses capacity prices . . . [it was] 
statutorily mandated to protect the RPM against the effects of 
such entry.”  April 12 Order ¶ 143 (Joint App. 68).  FERC 
further noted its agreement with its Independent Market 
Monitor that “permitting a state exemption may in fact, over 
the long run, result in less investment in capacity and 
demand-side resources and the need in the future for 
additional subsidies from the state.”  November 17 Order ¶ 97 
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(Joint App. 132).   In addition, FERC took into particular 
consideration the concern, as expressed by the Pennsylvania 
Public Utility Commission, that the state exemption could 
adversely affect other states that wished to rely on prices in 
the capacity market to incentivize new entry, as opposed to 
relying on state subsidies.  See April 12 Order ¶ 142 (Joint 
App. 67-68); November 17 Order ¶ 96 (Joint App. 132).  In 
sum, FERC noted that while its “intent [was] not to pass 
judgment on state and local policies and objectives with 
regard to the development of new capacity resources, or 
unreasonably interfere with those objectives”, the agency was 
“forced to act, however, when subsidized entry supported by 
one state’s or locality’s policies has the effect of disrupting 
the competitive price signals that PJM’s RPM is designed to 
produce, and that PJM as a whole, including other states, rely 
on to attract sufficient capacity.”  November 17 Order ¶ 3 
(Joint App. 106).   
 
 In addition, FERC adequately responded to various 
arguments against eliminating the exemption.  In response to 
arguments from New Jersey and Maryland that eliminating 
the state exemption would do away with a state’s bargained-
for ability to generate resources the state believed the RPM 
process had failed to provide, FERC noted that “any state is 
free to seek an exemption from the MOPR under section 
206,” if it believes that the resources available through RPM 
are not adequately fulfilling its capacity needs.  See April 12 
Order ¶ 143 (Joint App. 68).  FERC opined that the states’ 
right to petition for an individual exemption under § 206 
preserved their ability to provide for new generation entry 
while avoiding interfering with FERC’s “duty under the FPA 
to assure just and reasonable rates in wholesale markets.”  Id.  
In response to concerns about timing, FERC pointed out that 
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states are free to file for an exemption under § 206 prior to 
initiating the process to select new resources.  November 17 
Order ¶ 99 (Joint App. 133).  In response to arguments from 
various parties, including Petitioners in this case, that the 
RPM’s emphasis on cost alone ignored other important state 
objectives, including “environmental or technological goals, 
[and] reliability concerns beyond a three-year forecast,” 
FERC invited PJM stakeholders to propose a solution.  See 
November 17 Order ¶ 90 (Joint App. 130): “If PJM market 
participants agree that RPM should account for resource 
attributes that reflect broader objectives than three-year 
forward reliability, then PJM and its stakeholders should 
begin a process to consider how to incorporate these features 
into RPM’s market design.”  Id.  However, FERC counseled 
that such solution must not “undermine the objective of RPM 
to procure the least-cost, competitively-priced combination of 
resources necessary to meet the region’s reliability objectives 
on a three-year forward basis.”  Id.   
 
 We note briefly that our conclusion that FERC’s 
elimination of the state-mandated exemption was justified 
does not rely upon the existence or availability of the FRR 
alternative.  In its Orders, FERC pointed out that states and 
LSEs “seeking full independence in resource procurement 
choices” could opt out of the RPM altogether through the 
FRR, and forego the opportunity to purchase or sell any 
capacity through the RPM market.  See, e.g., April 12 Order ¶ 
137 (Joint App. 65); id. at ¶ 193 (Joint App. 81) (“The FRR 
option is the alternative for load serving entities that wish to 
secure their own capacity resources outside of a competitive 
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market, whether as directed by state-authorized integrated 
resource plans, or pursuant to other considerations.”).26
 In its briefing and throughout the record, FERC notes 
the existence of the FRR as an “alternative” to the Reliability 
Market in responding to states’ and LSEs’ concerns regarding 
the MOPR.  Petitioners New Jersey and Maryland and the 
Load Petitioners all provide convincing evidence, however, 
that the FRR is not a viable alternative for them.
   
 
27
                                              
26 Exclusion from the RPM market for entities using the FRR 
option is necessary to ensure that sponsoring entities cannot 
take advantage of the market-based nature of the RPM while 
withholding its own supply sources.  See April 12 Order ¶ 
193 (Joint App. 81) (“To protect the integrity of PJM’s 
wholesale capacity markets under RPM . . . , new self-supply 
seeking to participate in the RPM market must compete with 
other planned generation on the same competitive basis.”); 
see also P3 Br. 81 (“[I]f [the FRR] alternative were designed 
to require procurement of only a subset of the buyers’ 
capacity needs, the buyer could segment its purchasing 
activities, reducing the volume of its purchase through RPM 
in order to reduce auction clearing prices, while using the 
FRR process for the remainder.”).   
 
27 As noted supra, Petitioners argue that, because it requires 
an LSE to demonstrate to PJM that it can use its self-supply 
to meet projected capacity obligations for an entire five-year 
period, and to forego the ability to buy or sell capacity in the 
PJM auctions during that time, the FRR option is a viable 
alternative only for large utilities that still follow the 
vertically integrated model.   
  FERC 
does not counter this evidence; rather the agency merely 
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responds that it never indicated that the FRR would be a 
“desirable or appropriate” alternative for all states or LSEs.  
See FERC Br. 39-40.  We agree with Petitioners that the 
agency has given short shrift to their arguments that the FRR 
is simply not a feasible alternative for them.  But Petitioners 
provide no authority for the proposition that FERC is actually 
required to provide states and LSEs wishing to purchase or 
sell capacity in interstate commerce with an alternative to the 
Reliability Market.  Absent such authority, we cannot hold 
that the lack of a feasible alternative that would allow states 
and LSEs to avoid having their capacity sell offers mitigated 
is fatal to FERC’s Orders here. 
 
 FERC’s reasoning repeatedly refers to the economic 
harm that could result from the potential price suppression 
permitted by the state-mandated exemption.  The agency 
explicitly cites the “mounting evidence of risk” that the state-
mandated exemption “could allow uneconomic entry” to the 
RPM.  April 12 Order ¶ 139 (Joint App. 66).  Although it 
could easily be argued that this danger was foreseeable in 
2006 when the MOPR was first approved, FERC has 
adequately advanced a rationale for its about-face—namely, 
that states were actually structuring contracts for the 
development of new resources in a way that would 
substantially suppress prices, threatening imminent economic 
harm.  The speculation has become reality.  As such, it cannot 
be said that FERC acted without substantial evidence.    
 
 It is more than mildly disturbing that, by endorsing a 
state-mandated exemption with perfectly predictable 
incentives, FERC would allow sovereign states and private 
parties to be drawn into making complex and costly 
investments, only to later pull the rug out from under those 
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who were persuaded that the exemption was somehow real.  
That FERC has done so based on little more than the claim 
that the agency had an “ah ha” moment when foreseeable 
outcomes approached fruition only makes matters worse.  Our 
power to rein in bureaucratic behavior like this is, however, 
constrained.  The “arbitrary and capricious” standard of the 
APA is a high bar indeed, and many agency actions worthy of 
condemnation are not so deficient that they can be said to 
cross it.  Such is the case here. 
 
  2. Automatic Clearance for Self-Supply 
 As noted supra, prior to the 2011 MOPR reforms at 
issue in this matter, PJM’s tariff provided that, in the Base 
Residual Auction, PJM would accept “first, all Sell Offers in 
their entirety designated as self-supply committed regardless 
of price; (ii) then, all Sell Offers of zero, prorating to the 
extent necessary, and (iii) then all remaining Sell Offers in 
order of the lowest price . . . .”  PJM Tariff Attachment DD, 
Section 5.14(h)(4) (emphasis in original).  In its original § 
206 filing with FERC, P3 construed this language in PJM’s 
tariff as providing a complete exemption from the MOPR for 
resources designated as self-supply.  Accordingly, in its 
revised tariff filing, PJM proposed to delete this subsection.  
PJM claimed that in eliminating this language, it sought 
merely to “clarify” that self-supply offers were not exempted 
from the MOPR.  April 12 Order ¶ 184 (Joint App. 78).  
FERC accepted this “clarification”, stating that it “agree[d] 
with PJM that its current tariff does not exempt resources that 
are planned to be self-supply from the MOPR and therefore 
agree[d] that the current revisions do not change the tariff.”  
Id. at ¶ 139 (Joint App. 80-81).  Furthermore, FERC held, 
“even if this did constitute a change,” the agency “agree[d] 
with PJM that planned generation designated by a load 
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serving entity as self-supply should be classified as a capacity 
resource and be subject to an offer floor based on its entry 
costs until it clears in the base residual auction.”  Id. (Joint 
App. 81). 
 
 Load Petitioners take issue with FERC’s 
characterization of this as a “clarification”.  Load Petitioners 
urge that FERC, in approving PJM’s change, has essentially 
set up a straw-man argument by considering and rejecting a 
complete exemption for self-supply from the MOPR.  Load 
Petitioners argue that, by gearing its response to an argument 
that self supply investment should receive a complete 
exemption from the MOPR—an argument that Load 
Petitioners never made—FERC failed to address Load 
Petitioners’ real concerns regarding the elimination of 
guaranteed clearance for self-supply.28
                                              
28 Namely, Load Petitioners contend that FERC’s approval of 
the elimination of guaranteed clearance for self-supply 
“departs from its prior orders that consistently recognized 
self-supply as the preferred capacity source for LSEs” and 
“disregards reasons rational LSEs have long chosen self-
supply—including long-term cost and revenue benefits, 
increased long-term reliability, economic development, and 
resource diversity.”  Load Petitioners’ Br. 12, 21.   They 
argue that FERC’s action was in contradiction to FERC’s 
own determination that self-supply offers should not be 
“automatically suspect.”  Id. at 20.  Furthermore, they assert 
that while existing resources are shielded from competition, 
consumers served by self-supplying LSEs may have to pay 
twice for their capacity if the self-supply resources fail to 
clear the auction.  Accordingly, as the LSEs see it, FERC’s 
elimination of guaranteed clearance for self-supply provision 
   In doing so, Load 
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Petitioners argue, FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously, 
and without substantial evidence. 
 
 Indeed, FERC based much of its reasoning for 
accepting PJM’s elimination of this provision on economic 
arguments that assumed that the language as it previously 
existed might be interpreted to mean that such offers would 
not be subject to price mitigation.  See April 12 Order ¶ 195 
(Joint App. 81-82) (“[P]ermitting new self-supply to compete 
as a price-taker in RPM impermissibly shifts the investment 
costs of self-supply to competitive supply by suppressing 
market clearing prices . . . .”); November 17 Order     ¶ 205 
(Joint App. 163) (“[W]e reaffirm the Commission’s finding in 
the April 12 Order that a blanket, across-the-board MOPR 
exemption for resources designated as self-supply would 
allow for an unacceptable opportunity to exercise buyer 
market power and thus could inhibit competitive 
investment.”). 29
                                                                                                     
violated antitrust principles by favoring existing competitors.  
Id. at 24-30.   
   
 
29 Indeed, in its briefing before this Court, FERC continued to 
assert arguments as to why the MOPR should not afford self-
supply a complete exemption from mitigation.  See, e.g., 
FERC Br. 4 (describing the issue for review as whether FERC 
reasonably determined “that revising the tariff to clarify that 
the Minimum Offer Price Rule applies to planned resources 
designated as self-supply was just and reasonable”).  
Furthermore, the policy reasons FERC advances against 
guaranteed clearance for self-supply deal with preventing 
artificial price suppression.  FERC fails to explain why the 
danger of such price suppression would remain even where 
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 It was not until the Order on Rehearing that FERC 
addressed Load Petitioners’ arguments that the original 
MOPR guaranteed that self-supply would clear the auction, 
albeit at a potentially mitigated price.  See March 15 Order ¶ 
27  (Joint App. 192) (dismissing the “assertion that the 
Commission erred by not guaranteeing clearance for all self-
supply sell offers that receive an adjusted, unit-specific offer 
floor.”).  FERC asserted that guaranteed clearance for self-
supply would not serve the goals of the MOPR, because 
“[s]imply receiving an adjusted unit-specific floor does not 
mean that the market requires that unit at the adjusted floor 
bid.  Assuring every unit with an adjusted unit-specific floor 
that it will clear the market could result in PJM rejecting the 
offer from a less expensive unit that otherwise would have 
cleared.” March 15 Order ¶ 28 (Joint App. 193).  Even while 
purporting to consider and reject these arguments, however, 
FERC’s Orders never actually addressed the plain language 
of the original MOPR, which unambiguously stated that, in 
Base Residual Auction, PJM must accept “first, all Sell Offers 
in their entirety designated as self-supply committed 
regardless of price”.30
                                                                                                     
self-supply offers were subject to the MOPR’s mitigation 
features.   Id. 
  In approving the removal of that 
provision, FERC eliminated guaranteed clearance for self-
 
30 Although reviewing courts “generally give[] substantial 
deference to [FERC’s] interpretation of filed tariffs, even 
where the issue simply involves the proper construction of 
language . . . we do not defer to FERC’s interpretation when 
the tariff language is unambiguous.”  Old Dominion Elec. 
Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 518 F.3d 43, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(internal quotations marks and citations omitted).    
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supply offers, fundamentally changing the MOPR’s treatment 
of self-supply, but barely acknowledging that it was making 
any change at all.  One strains to accept such scant treatment 
as “reasoned analysis” sufficient to satisfy the demands of the 
APA.  See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 57 (“[A]n agency 
changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis” for the 
change) (internal quotation marks omitted); FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (requiring 
agencies to generally “display awareness” of a change in 
position); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 567 F.3d 
at 667 (an agency departing from its prior position must 
“suppl[y] a reasoned analysis . . . showing that prior policies 
and standards are being deliberately changed, not casually 
ignored.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); 
Greater Bos. Television, 444 F.2d at 852 (“[I]f an agency 
glosses over or swerves from prior precedents without 
discussion it may cross the line from the tolerably terse to the 
intolerably mute.”). 31
                                              
31 In contrast to FERC’s light treatment of the issue, PJM 
provided an extensive response to Load Petitioners’ 
arguments regarding automatic clearing of self-supply.  See 
Answer of PJM to Comments and Protests, March 21, 2011 
(Joint App. 2269-72); see also PJM Intervenor Brief 23-29.  
PJM’s argument is essentially that (1) the provision as it 
existed was ambiguous; and (2) in light of this ambiguity, this 
Court should agree with PJM that the provision did not 
guarantee automatic clearance for self-supply.  As to the latter 
point, PJM argues against interpreting the provision to 
guarantee clearance because such interpretation would have 
so contradicted the purposes of the MOPR that it could not 
have possibly been correct.  Id. at 28.  We cannot accept 
PJM’s argument for several reasons.  First, as we have 
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 But while we have concerns about FERC’s decision-
making process in this regard, we do not have jurisdiction to 
review its action, because while this petition was pending, 
FERC has again changed its stance on the proper treatment of 
self-supply, rendering the Load Petitioners’ challenge moot.  
As noted supra, FERC recently approved an exemption to the 
MOPR for self-supply resources.  143 FERC ¶ 61,090 (May 
2, 2013).  Specifically, it decided that “providing exemptions 
for resources properly designated as self-supply when they 
meet suitable [requirements] is reasonable.”  Id. at ¶ 108.  
Although the Load Petitioners are not satisfied with the new 
exemption, PJM’s treatment of self-supply resources has 
fundamentally changed.  Under the 2011 orders challenged 
here, self-supply offers received no special treatment, but 
rather were forced to compete at cost-based prices.  Under the 
2013 Order, such offers are exempt from mitigation entirely if 
                                                                                                     
previously noted, the language of the provision itself, 
requiring PJM to accept “first, all Sell Offers in their entirety 
designated as self-supply committed regardless of price”, was 
not ambiguous.  See PJM Tariff Attachment DD, Section 
5.14(h)(4) (emphasis in original).  Second, PJM’s claim that it 
would never have provided for guaranteed clearance due to 
the economic inefficiencies of such policy is undermined by 
the fact it has since revised the MOPR to guarantee a more 
extensive exemption than Load Petitioners had originally 
urged.  Even if FERC had expressly adopted PJM’s policy-
based arguments against guaranteed clearing for self-supply, 
we would have a difficult time agreeing that such adoption 
was the subject of a reasoned analysis absent an 
acknowledgment that such treatment constituted a 
fundamental change in the MOPR’s treatment of such 
resources.  
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they satisfy proposed “net-short” and “net-long” tests.  Id. at ¶ 
107.  Indeed, in justifying its proposed change to FERC, PJM 
emphasized the importance of protecting “traditional business 
models” by exempting “projects developed as self-supply by 
municipals, cooperative utilities, and vertically integrated 
utilities operating under integrated resource plans developed 
under state-approved rules.”  Id. at ¶  81.      
 
 Such “a fundamental change in the state of affairs” 
renders our review of this issue moot.  See Motor & Equip. 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. Nichols, 142 F.3d 449, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  
The Load Petitioners may still have complaints about PJM’s 
treatment of self-supply, but the nature of that treatment is 
completely different than it was under the challenged orders.  
“The old set of rules, which are the subject of this lawsuit, 
cannot be evaluated as if nothing has changed.”  Nat’l Min. 
Ass’n v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 251 F.3d 1007, 1011 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001).  Rather, because “[a] new system is now in place,” 
id., our review of the old system would merely be advisory, 
unless the Load Petitioners suffered a redressable injury while 
the old system was in place.  See Freeport-McMoran Oil & 
Gas Co. v. FERC, 962 F.2d 45, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
(concluding that a case was “plainly moot” because the 
challenged orders had been “superseded by a subsequent 
FERC order, and while the challenged orders were in effect 
petitioners suffered no injury this court can redress”).  The 
record does not show any injury-in-fact that the Load 
Petitioners experienced during the 2011 and 2012 capacity 
auctions, and at oral argument the only possible injury they 
could point to was having to briefly negotiate with the 
Independent Market Monitor before their offered resources 
successfully cleared an auction.  Although that negotiation 
may have been frustrating to the Load Petitioners, it does not 
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amount to “a concrete and particularized invasion of a legally 
protected interest.” Motor & Equip., 142 F.3d at 457 (citing 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).  
Therefore, as “interim . . . events have completely and 
irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation,” id. 
at 459, we conclude that the Load Petitioners’ challenge to 
FERC’s treatment of self-supply resources is moot.      
            
  3. Undue Discrimination 
 
   a. Exemption for Solar and Wind 
Powered Resources 
 
 From its inception, the PJM Reliability Market has 
exempted from the MOPR nuclear, coal and hydroelectric 
generation, permitting those resources to bid zero-price offers 
into the Auction.  In the 2011 Orders, FERC accepted PJM’s 
proposal to add wind and solar facilities to this list of 
exemptions.  As a result, the only resources subject to the 
MOPR are natural gas-fired technologies.  New Jersey, Hess 
Corporation, and Intervenor CPV Power urge that targeting 
only gas-fired resources for mitigation amounts to undue 
discrimination in violation of the FPA.  They argue that 
“[b]elow-cost offers from gas, nuclear, hydroelectric, wind, or 
solar facilities all have the same ‘price suppression’ impacts”,  
N.J. Br. 28, and therefore, subjecting only gas-fired resources 
to the MOPR undermines the competitive goals FERC is 
purportedly trying to achieve.   
 
 New Jersey does not attempt to argue that FERC failed 
to justify its decision to apply the MOPR to gas-fired 
resources and not to other types of generation.  The state 
admits that FERC “asserts that the characteristics of gas units 
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make them more likely to be used as price suppression tools.”  
Id. at 28; see also id. at 29 (noting FERC’s recognition that 
gas units “are relatively large and can be developed quickly”).  
New Jersey merely asserts that those very characteristics 
make them useful in abating New Jersey’s energy crisis, and 
therefore are “useless in distinguishing legitimate from 
illegitimate intent.”  Id. at 29. 
 
 FERC points out that the FPA prevents only “undue” 
discrimination, and that “according different treatment to 
different classes of entities . . . does not amount to undue 
discrimination under the FPA when the classes are not 
similarly-situated.”  November 17 Order ¶ 109 (Joint App. 
135).  In the April 12 Order, FERC set out its reasoning for 
sanctioning PJM’s proposal: 
 
[Gas-fired generators] have the 
shortest development time to 
respond to capacity needs and 
thus are more efficient resources 
to suppress capacity prices.  In 
addition, . . . wind and solar 
resources are a poor choice if a 
developer’s primary purpose is to 
suppress capacity market prices.  
Due to the intermittent energy 
output of wind and solar 
resources, the capacity value of 
these resources is only a fraction 
of the nameplate capacity.  This 
means that wind and solar 
resources would need to offer as 
much as eight times the nameplate 
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capacity of a [gas-fired] resource 
in order to achieve the same price 
suppression effect. 
 
 April 12 Order at ¶ 153 (Joint App. 70); see also 
November 17 Order at ¶ 111 (Joint App. 136) (“In accepting 
PJM’s proposal to subject [gas-fired] resources to the MOPR, 
the Commission’s focus was on those factors that could 
contribute to price suppression.”).  FERC also notes that gas-
fired resources can be constructed within the three-year time 
frame between the auction and the time the resource must be 
put into use.  Accordingly, the net incremental costs of a gas-
fired resource at the time of the first auction in which it 
participates are near its full construction costs.  Other 
resources, on the other hand, take longer to build and 
therefore must begin construction well in advance of entering 
the capacity market.  By the time they participate in an 
auction, they have much lower incremental costs and would 
therefore have a minimum price floor substantially below full 
construction cost.  In addition, the short build time of gas-
fired resources means that sponsors of such projects are able 
to offer bids which, if they do not clear, may be reassessed or 
abandoned, whereas other resources may already have 
invested significant capital by the time they are required to 
offer their capacity into the auction.  For all of these reasons, 
FERC argues, the exempted resources are not similar to gas-
fired resources; accordingly, the MOPR’s disparate treatment 
of the various types of capacity resources does not constitute 
undue discrimination.   
 
 In sum, FERC fully explained its reasons for 
approving PJM’s proposal to subject gas-fired resources to 
the MOPR while exempting other types of generation; New 
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Jersey’s disagreement with FERC’s justification does not 
render the agency’s decision arbitrary and capricious.    
 
   b. Discrimination Against New 
Subsidized Entry 
 
 New Jersey also argues that the new unit-specific 
review process, which permits a seller to justify a sell offer 
below the MOPR trigger threshold based on the resource’s 
competitive cost advantages, permits undue discrimination 
based on the type of subsidy a resource receives.  PJM 
provided examples of the types of “competitive cost 
advantages” it would view as legitimately lowering the offer 
price of a resource, including “costs resulting from the 
capacity market seller’s business model, financial condition, 
tax status, access to capital[, . . . and] net revenues that are 
reasonably demonstrated, under the MOPR, to be higher than 
estimated for the MOPR screen.”  See November 17 Order ¶ 
213 (Joint App. 166).  In effect, PJM would “evaluate 
whether a subsidy, grant, or revenue is of the type 
customarily enjoyed by the type of seller at issue and whether 
the cost or revenue item pre-existed RPM.”  Id. at ¶ 245 (Joint 
App. 176).  On the other hand, PJM would not view as 
legitimately lowering cost “claimed cost savings or revenue 
sources that appear irregular or anomalous, that do not reflect 
arm’s-length transactions, or that are not in the ordinary 
course of the seller’s business.”  Id. at ¶ 213 (Joint App. 66).  
Presumably, the state initiatives in New Jersey and Maryland 
would fit into the latter category.  New Jersey argues that this 
is unduly discriminatory, because “‘new’ and ‘customary’ 
subsidies do not differ in their effects” on competition.  New 
Jersey asserts that FERC “wrongly treat[s] a subsidy’s 
vintage as indicating whether it was motivated to suppress 
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RPM prices or to accomplish a legitimate purpose.”  N.J. Br. 
32. 
 
 Here again, FERC fully explained its reasons for 
permitting PJM, in administering the unit-specific review 
process, to view some methods of cost-savings differently 
from others.  FERC notes that “the MOPR was not intended 
to change the long-standing business models parties use to 
support investment in specific capacity procurement 
projects.”  November 17 Order ¶ 242 (Joint App. 175).  
FERC agreed with PJM that the unit-specific review process 
“appropriately recognizes varying long-standing business 
structures and practices [such as tax status, access to capital, 
and other advantages customarily enjoyed by that type of 
seller] while also protecting against attempts to exercise 
buyer market power.”  Id. at ¶ 244 (Joint App. 175).  In other 
words, FERC recognized the desire of generators to retain the 
cost-saving advantages they had traditionally enjoyed since 
before the RPM came into existence, and balanced this desire 
against the danger that some entities would provide “irregular 
and anomalous” subsidies not available to other resources in 
an attempt to exercise buyer market power.  FERC’s asserted 
reason for this differing treatment is not arbitrary or 
capricious, and is consistent with its statutory duty to protect 
the integrity of the capacity markets.     
 
 
 B. Cross-Petitioners’ Arguments 
 
  1.  Calculation of Energy and Ancillary 
Services Offsets 
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 PJM’s § 205 filing for the first time defined a method 
for calculating “energy and ancillary services offsets,” which 
are the expected revenues a new generation resource will 
likely earn from the sale of energy and ancillary services.  
These revenues are used to “offset”, i.e., are subtracted from, 
a resource’s estimated construction costs to determine the 
resource’s net CONE—the higher the estimated revenues, the 
lower the net CONE, and therefore the lower the threshold 
used to determine whether a new resource will trigger the 
MOPR.  Prior to the 2011 Orders, PJM’s tariff did not 
provide for any method for estimating energy and ancillary 
services offsets.  In its § 205 filing, PJM proposed to calculate 
these offsets for a given resource based on the revenues 
earned by the highest-earning resources in the PJM zone 
where the resource is located.  This calculation would, 
presumably, lead the resource to be assigned a lower net 
CONE and, consequently, a lower mitigation threshold.   
 
 P3 assails the “zonal” approach as unjust and 
unreasonable.  It argues that the artificially low mitigation 
threshold “will . . . permit uneconomic resources to enter, 
clear the Base Residual Auction and artificially suppress 
prices.  This outcome is neither administratively necessary 
nor just, reasonable and non-discriminatory.”  (Joint App. 
1572)  P3 argues that FERC instead should have directed 
PJM to calculate energy and ancillary services offsets using a 
“nodal” approach, which would base expected revenues on 
the actual location of the new resource.32
                                              
32 The parties appear to agree that location-specific “nodal” 
data is readily available.   
   
 
78 
 
 FERC’s justification for finding PJM’s proposal just 
and reasonable is two-fold.  First, FERC asserted that PJM’s 
proposed method for calculating revenues is consistent with 
the existing VRR Curve guidelines, which are used to 
construct the simulated demand curve used in PJM’s capacity 
auctions.  See November 17 Order ¶ 30 (Joint App. 113) 
(“[W]e find that use of zonal LMPs, rather than nodal LMPs, 
for the MOPR screens is appropriate, given this 
methodology’s consistency with PJM’s existing VRR Curve 
guidelines.”).  P3 asserts that this justification for using the 
zonal approach must be rejected because the zonal 
methodology is not actually the same as that used to construct 
the VRR curve, and notes that PJM itself described the zonal 
approach as an “adjustment” to the VRR Curve guidelines.  
See P3 Br. 48.  FERC responds that it did not condition its 
approval on the new approach being identical to the VRR 
Curve guidelines; rather it noted that PJM’s proposed 
approach was “consistent” with the guidelines, and indeed it 
expressly approved PJM’s proposed “adjustment” from the 
guidelines’ approach.  FERC Br. 81.  Furthermore, FERC 
argues that P3 waived this argument by failing to raise it on 
rehearing.  P3 disagrees that it waived the argument, stating 
that the April 12 Order did not sufficiently put P3 on notice 
that consistency with VRR Curve guidelines was a basis for 
FERC’s approval of the zonal approach, and therefore P3 
could not have been expected to contest this rationale on 
rehearing.   
 
 We agree with P3 that FERC did not clearly tie the 
VRR Curve consistency justification to the zonal approach in 
the April 12 Order, and therefore P3’s argument is not 
waived.  We further agree with P3 that the zonal approach 
appears to be no more “consistent” with the methodology 
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used in the VRR Curve guidelines than P3’s proposed nodal 
approach.  However, FERC advanced an additional rationale 
for finding PJM’s proposed zonal approach just and 
reasonable, and for rejecting P3’s preferred approach.  
Namely, FERC urged that “the use of nodal LMP values 
could trigger the market power screen even though the 
resource was simply using its historical energy and ancillary 
services revenues offset for its zone.”  April 12 Order ¶ 47 
(Joint App. 41).  In other words, FERC agreed with PJM that 
the methodology for calculating energy and ancillary services 
offsets—a calculation that is, after all, merely an estimate—
should make it easier, and not more difficult, for a resource to 
avoid mitigation.   
 
 P3 argues that structuring the calculation to permit 
more resources to pass the MOPR screens “is not a proper 
objective”.  P3 Br. 45.  However, P3 fails to explain why 
erring on the side of allowing more resources to avoid 
mitigation is not a permissible policy.  Surely FERC is 
permitted to weigh the danger of price suppression against the 
counter-danger of over-mitigation, and determine where it 
wishes to strike the balance.  See NRG Power Marketing, 
LLC v. FERC, 718 F.3d 947, 961 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (declining 
to “review FERC’s balancing of competing interests”); 
Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 616 F.3d at 541-42 (upholding 
FERC’s tariff order where the agency “reflected on the 
competing interests at stake to explain why it struck the 
balance it did”). 
 
 P3 may be correct that basing energy and ancillary 
services offsets on a resource’s actual location results in a 
more accurate calculation of net CONE.  However, the fact 
that there may be a better, or more accurate, calculation does 
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not render PJM’s proposal unjust or unreasonable, or FERC’s 
approval of it arbitrary and capricious.  FERC noted as much 
in its November 17 Order, stating that “[t]here may be more 
than one method that provides a reasonably accurate forecast 
of future revenues over time.  The relevant question here is 
whether PJM’s proposed method is likely to provide a 
reasonably accurate forecast.” 33
                                              
33 In the November 17 Order, FERC stated that it was “not 
required to consider whether additional, alternative 
approaches might also have been reasonable.”  November 17 
Order ¶ 30 (Joint App. 113).  According to P3, this statement 
indicates that FERC had incorrectly characterized its 
proposed approach as a § 206 challenge to PJM’s tariff, as 
conditionally approved on April 12, 2011, and therefore 
inappropriately placed the burden on P3 to demonstrate that 
PJM’s proposal was unjust and unreasonable.  P3 cites 
several cases to support the general principle that FERC, 
before choosing a particular course of action, must consider 
facially reasonable alternatives.  See P3 Br. at 46-47 and n.12.  
None of the cases cited, however, actually involves FERC’s 
application of the “just and reasonable” standard under § 205, 
pursuant to which a utility proposes revisions to its own tariff, 
and FERC’s review is limited to determining whether the 
utility’s preferred revision is just and reasonable.  FERC 
denies that it construed P3’s challenge to the tariff revision as 
a § 206 challenge and argues that P3 simply fails to 
understand the burden-shifting mechanism under § 205, 
whereby PJM had the burden of showing that its tariff 
proposal was just and reasonable, after which the burden then 
shifted to P3 to demonstrate that PJM’s proposed approach 
was unjust and unreasonable.  FERC determined that PJM 
carried its burden, and P3 did not.  We believe that FERC has 
  November 17 Order ¶ 28 
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(Joint App. 113).  See ExxonMobil Gas Mktg. Co. v. FERC, 
297 F.3d 1071, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“The burden is on the 
petitioners to show that the Commission’s choices are 
unreasonable and its chosen line of demarcation is not within 
a zone of reasonableness as distinct from the question of 
whether the line drawn by the Commission is precisely 
right.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Serono Labs, Inc. 
v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[C]ourts 
are bound to uphold an agency interpretation as long as it is 
reasonable—regardless of whether there may be other 
reasonable, or even more reasonable, views.”).  FERC has 
articulated legitimate reasons for finding PJM’s preferred 
method for calculating energy and ancillary services offsets 
just and reasonable, and that is all that is required to do.   
 
  2. Single-Auction Clearance Requirement  
 
 Prior to the 2011 MOPR revisions, new resources were 
automatically exempt from mitigation after participating in, 
but not necessarily clearing, one auction.  Asserting that such 
allowance “rendered the MOPR toothless,” P3 instead urges 
in its § 206 complaint that a new resource should be required 
to clear two annual auctions.  See P3 Br. 49.  In support of 
this position, P3 notes that such an approach would closely 
approximate FERC’s recently approved standard for the 
NYISO (the New York area equivalent of PJM).  In its § 205 
filing, PJM itself proposed an even stronger rule, by which 
the MOPR would apply to a new resource up to and including 
the second successive annual auction after a resource first 
clears.  Finally, PJM’s Independent Market Monitor proposed 
                                                                                                     
the better argument on this point, and in any case, FERC 
adequately, albeit succinctly, responded to P3’s criticisms.   
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a hybrid rule permitting a new resource to clear only one 
auction, as long as it also demonstrated that it was not 
receiving any out-of-market subsidies.  
 
 FERC did not accept any of these proposals in its 
entirety.  Rather, FERC decided that a new resource would no 
longer be subject to mitigation after it cleared one auction at 
an offer price near its full cost of entry.  FERC’s rationale 
was that a resource that has successfully cleared an auction at 
or near its cost is “needed” by the market and is therefore 
economic.  It does not matter, FERC ruled, whether or not the 
resource later receives a subsidy.  
 
 P3 claims that FERC’s decision was arbitrary and 
capricious.  First it argues that though FERC purported to be 
adopting the recommendation of the Independent Market 
Monitor, the agency in fact adopted only part of the Market 
Monitor’s recommendation (the one-auction requirement) 
while declining to adopt the other, key part: that the resource 
not receive any subsidies from outside the PJM market.  P3 
contends that “[t]hat cherry picking left FERC standing alone, 
adopting a proposal supported by no party, testimony, or 
evidence.”  Id. at 51.  Second, P3 argues that by allowing a 
resource to receive discriminatory subsidies after clearing 
only one auction, FERC is essentially sanctioning the exercise 
of buyer-side market power.  Third, P3 asserts that FERC’s 
decision “departs, without reasoned explanation” from the 
rule it recently approved for the NYISO.  Id. at 53.  P3 cites 
testimony from its own expert, who urged that, because 
NYISO’s monthly auctions and PJM’s annual auction are 
both “driven by the requirement to meet peak demand in the 
summer”, NYISO’s rule is “directly analogous” to a two-year 
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auction clearing rule.  Id. at 54.34
 FERC has adequately responded to P3’s arguments.  
First, as FERC points out, P3 does not provide any support 
for its suggestion that FERC must adopt a third party’s 
proposal in full in order to meet the “substantial evidence” 
standard.  Under § 206, FERC may act on its own accord to 
change any practice that, in its opinion, renders a rate, charge 
or classification unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory.  16 
U.S.C. § 824e.  In doing so, it is free to eschew the proposals 
of other parties and invoke its own expertise, as long as it 
does so in a manner that is not arbitrary or capricious.  See 
EarthLink, Inc. v. FCC, 462 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(“[A]n agency’s predictive judgments about areas that are 
  P3 argues that FERC’s 
application of a different standard for PJM than the one it 
applied for the NYISO represents a “chang[e] in course,” and 
that FERC must supply a reasonable analysis for the 
differential treatment.  See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 
U.S. at 57. 
 
                                              
34 See NYISO Mitigation Enhancements Order, 133 FERC ¶ 
61,178.  Under the rule FERC originally approved for 
NYISO, resources become exempt after clearing at least 
twelve of the previous 24 monthly auctions.  P3 alleges that 
this clearance requirement was also subject to a minimum 
period of six “capability periods”, or approximately three 
years.  P3 Br. 53-54.  However, FERC asserts that P3 
misunderstands this portion of its ruling, and that FERC 
actually “expressly rejected any minimum” and instead 
“allowed resources to become permanently exempt from 
mitigation after clearing the market for one year (12 monthly 
auctions in the New York market).”  FERC Br. 88 (citing 133 
FERC ¶ 61,178 at ¶ 51). 
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within the agency’s field of discretion and expertise are 
entitled to particularly deferential review, as long as they are 
reasonable . . . .”) (internal citations omitted) (alteration in 
original)).   
 
 In the 2011 Orders, FERC described the reasons it 
chose to require a new capacity resource to clear one auction 
before escaping mitigation under the MOPR.  Namely, FERC 
concluded that “once a new resource has cleared in one 
auction at the offer price floor, the resource has demonstrated 
that it is needed by the market and it is therefore economic.”  
See April 12 Order ¶ 175 (Joint App. 76).  FERC believed 
that applying the MOPR after that point “could therefore 
inefficiently discourage the entry of a new capacity that is 
economic.”  Id.  Furthermore, FERC explained its reasons for 
declining to implement the other component of the 
Independent Market Monitor’s proposal because “even if 
discriminatory subsidies are being received, if the resource is 
needed at the MOPR bid then it is a competitive resource and 
should be permitted to participate in the auction regardless of 
whether it also receives a subsidy.”  Id. at ¶ 177 (Joint App. 
77).35
                                              
35 P3 generally argues that FERC’s one-auction clearing 
requirement is discriminatory because it permits a new 
resource to receive subsidies, and therefore bid into the 
auction at an artificially low cost, only one year after clearing 
its first auction.  They argue that allowing a new resource to 
receive discriminatory subsidies in its second auction would 
affect the clearing price in the second year in the same way a 
below-cost offer would have done in the first year the 
resource was implemented.  Of course, if FERC had adopted 
P3’s proposal that a new resource escape mitigation after 
  FERC further addressed P3’s arguments at length in 
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the November 17 Order.  See November 17 Order ¶¶ 130-133 
(examining how P3’s proposal would function under various 
market conditions and concluding that clearing in one auction 
at a price approximating its full cost of entry demonstrates 
that a new resource is needed by the market and should not be 
subject to further mitigation).  See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. 
FERC, 400 F.3d 23, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“The court properly 
defers to policy determinations invoking the Commission’s 
expertise in evaluating complex market conditions.”). 
 
 Nor was FERC required to replicate the standard it 
approved for NYISO.  P3 offers no authority for the 
proposition that FERC must apply the same mitigation period 
for all RTOs under its jurisdiction; after all, under § 205, 
these organizations are largely tasked with coming up with 
their own rates, rules, and procedures, subject only to FERC’s 
determination that such rates, rules and procedures are “just 
and reasonable.”  16 U.S.C. § 824d.  Indeed, the two RTOs 
employ substantially different auction processes—PJM’s 
                                                                                                     
clearing two auctions, then such procedure could be criticized 
for permitting discriminatory subsidies in the third year.  
Accordingly, P3’s argument here is less about the number of 
auctions a new resource must clear before being subject to 
mitigation, than a rehashing of its complaints regarding 
FERC’s rejection of the No-Subsidy Off-Ramp. As discussed 
supra, FERC’s decision not to adopt the No-Subsidy Off-
Ramp was originally one of P3’s five independent challenges 
to FERC’s 2011 Orders.  In its 2013 Order, as described 
supra, FERC has now adopted a form of the No-Subsidy Off-
Ramp.  Accordingly, P3 has dropped its challenge to that 
particular part of the 2011 Orders.  Its challenge to the one-
auction clearing rule, however, remains alive. 
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capacity auctions are annual (or incremental), while NYISO 
holds auctions on a monthly basis.  Accordingly, it would be 
impossible for FERC to apply the exact same mitigation rules 
(with respect to both mitigation period and number of 
auctions a resource is required to clear) in both regions.  Nor 
do the decisions cited by P3 indicate that FERC’s approval of 
a different mitigation period for PJM than for NYISO would 
require remand.  See P3 Br. 54.  None involved an agency’s 
application of differing procedures in different regions, each 
with its own unique circumstances, and each largely tasked 
with formulating its own rules and procedures, subject only to 
the qualification that they be just and reasonable.36
                                              
36 Finally, P3 urges us to remand FERC’s orders in light of 
FERC’s subsequent order in Astoria Generating Co. v. New 
York Independent System Operator, Inc., 140 FERC ¶ 61,189 
(2012), where FERC required NYISO to apply a market 
power screen that would subject a capacity resource to an 
offer floor despite the fact that the resource had already 
cleared in several auctions.  We are not convinced that 
Astoria is inconsistent with the FERC order at issue here, as 
the capacity resource in that matter had cleared the NYISO 
auctions without being subject to an offer floor.  See id. at ¶ 
141.  On the contrary, the FERC rule at issue here requires 
that a new resource clear the PJM auction at or near its net 
cost of new entry once before escaping mitigation in 
subsequent auctions.   In any case, as P3 acknowledges, “[a]n 
agency’s decision is not arbitrary and capricious merely 
because it is not followed in a later adjudication.”  Brooklyn 
Union Gas Co. v. FERC, 409 F.3d 404, 406 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(quoting MacLeod v. ICC, 54 F.3d 888, 892 (D.C. Cir. 
1995)). 
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V.  
 
For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petitions for review of 
the 2011 Orders. 
